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GIVE PEACE A CHANCE: HOW CONSIDERING
PEACE PROCESS OBLIGATIONS WOULD
HAVE IMPROVED THE RULINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND
THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT ON THE
ISRAELI SECURITY BARRIER
CHARLES F. MARTEL*
“The
armed
conflict
has
left
many
wounded . . . .Bereavement and pain wash over us.”

dead

and

-Aharon Barak, President, Supreme Court of Israel,
1
from Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel
“I agree with almost all of what the Court has written . . . .My regrets
are rather about what it has chosen not to write.”
-Judge Rosalyn Higgins, International Court of Justice,
from Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
2
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion

INTRODUCTION
The remarks of President Barak and Judge Higgins reflect that
much was at stake when the Supreme Court of Israel (Israeli Court)
and International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the Israeli

Copyright © 2007 by Charles F. Martel.
* Charles Martel is an adjunct law professor at the American University Washington
College of Law and has an LLM degree in Human Rights Law from the London School of
Economics (LSE). This Article expands on the dissertation he wrote in that program. The
author thanks Professor Conor Gearty, Director of the Rausing Centre for Human Rights at the
LSE, for suggesting as a dissertation topic analysis of the two court decisions which are the
subject of this article.
1. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807, reprinted in 43
I.L.M. 1099 (2004).
2. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 20 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge
Higgins) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
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separation barrier.3 In Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, the Israeli
Court gave qualified approval to barrier construction in the occupied
West Bank, but ordered the government to reroute barrier segments
that caused disproportionate harm to Palestinians.4 The ICJ Advisory
Opinion more broadly held that the entire West Bank barrier route
5
violates international law.
This Article proposes an alternative analysis based on IsraeliPalestinian peace process agreements. The thesis is that the
agreements provide a more precise framework of legal obligations for
analyzing the barrier, and would more effectively promote peace than
the approach in either decision.
To paraphrase Judge Higgins, the agreements fill in what the
6
courts “chose not to write.” The Israeli Court failed to consider the
barrier as part of Israel’s illegal settlement policy in occupied
territory. As a result, Beit Sourik wrongly allows a route that
perpetuates Israeli possession of occupied territory. The ICJ
dismissed Israeli security, and failed to consider that Palestinian
failure to stop illegal terrorism led to Israel’s erection of the barrier.
As a result, the Advisory Opinion wrongly ignores Palestinian legal
responsibilities and imposes obligations only on Israel.
An agreement-based framework directly addresses these issues
by properly treating the barrier as the result of illegalities on both
sides. The analysis affirms Israel’s right to defend its citizens,
including settlers. However, barrier routes that perpetuate illegal
Israeli possession of contested territory would be prohibited.
Part I describes the barrier and summarizes the decisions. Part II
analyzes the decisions’ impact, showing that while the law now factors
in the barrier route, the decisions have not effectively addressed
issues central to the barrier, and the larger conflict of which the
barrier is part. Part III offers an agreement-based framework and
critique of the decisions, comparing peace process obligations with
3. Supporters of the structure call it a fence, and opponents call it a wall. While the
barrier includes concrete walls up to twenty-five feet high, it is predominantly a combination of
link and electric fences, trenches, patrol roads, and “no go zones” up to one hundred yards wide.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, John Dugard, On the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories
Occupied by Israel Since 1967, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/6 (Sept. 8, 2003) (prepared by John
Dugard) [hereinafter Rapporteur’s Report]. This Article will use the term “barrier” because its
functional accuracy lends itself to neutrality.
4. Beit Sourik, [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 para. 86.
5. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 137-38, 162.
6. Id. para. 20 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
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sources of international law that impose similar responsibilities
illustrating that the framework is legally correct and would better
7
promote peace.
A final introductory note is that the decisions reflect the courts’
8
different roles. The ICJ is an international court and responded to
the request of the United Nations General Assembly for a non9
binding advisory opinion on the entire barrier route. By contrast, the
Israeli Court bore the constraints of a domestic court, making a
binding ruling with national security implications on a small section of
10
the barrier. It has been observed that the Israeli Court’s restraint on
security issues contributes to its important ongoing authority in Israeli
society.11 Some have concluded that the Israeli Court’s decision on
the barrier was a continuation of this and that Beit Sourik was a more
pragmatic, effective ruling than the broader Advisory Opinion.12
Ultimately, because pending Israeli Court cases call for
reconsideration of the barrier’s legality, the framework proposed here
is offered not just as a critique of past decisions but as a suggestion for
future ones.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE
BARRIER AND SUMMARY OF THE DECISIONS
A. The Barrier
The Israeli government authorized the barrier in April 2002 after
a sharp rise in terrorist attacks,13 stating that the barrier was a

7. The relevance of peace agreements to the barrier was suggested by Geoffrey R.
Watson. See Geoffrey R. Watson, The “Wall” Decisions in Legal and Political Context, 99 AM.
J. INT’L L. 6, 22-24 (2005).
8. See Yuval Shany, Capacities and Inadequacies: A Look at the Two Separation Barrier
Cases, 38 ISR. L. R. 230, 233 (2005).
9. Id. at 231.
10. Id. at 232.
11. See generally DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME
COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 187-98 (2002). The Court is by far the
most trusted political institution in Israel. Yuval Yoaz, Public Rates Supreme Court as Most
Trustworthy State Authority, HAARETZ (Isr.), June 14, 2005.
12. See David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International
Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 90 n.22 (2005); Watson, supra note 7, at 25.
13. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/248 (Nov. 24, 2003) [hereinafter
Secretary-General Report]; Written Statement of the Government of Israel, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 131, at 7 (Jan. 30, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1579.pdf
[hereinafter Israeli Statement].

02__MARTEL.DOC

308

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

10/4/2007 9:51:58 AM

[Vol 17:305

temporary security measure, and not a political border.14 In October
2003, the Israeli Cabinet approved a continuous 720-kilometer barrier
15
route in and around the West Bank. Portions of the route tracked
the 1949 Armistice Line (or “Green Line”) demarking Israel’s pre1967 border, but most of the barrier was in occupied territory. The
route placed approximately 16.6 percent of the occupied West Bank,
237,000 Palestinians16 and eighty percent of the 400,000 Israeli settlers
17
in occupied territory on the Israeli side of the barrier.
B. The Decisions
1. Beit Sourik. Beit Sourik was decided on June 30, 2004. The
case concerned challenges to forty kilometers of the barrier, with the
Israeli Court invalidating thirty kilometers and ordering the
government to plan new routes less injurious to Palestinians affected
18
by the barrier.
The Israeli Court began by recognizing that Israel holds the West
Bank in a state of belligerent occupation, and stating that the law of
19
belligerent occupation applies to consideration of the barrier. The
Israeli Court then identified two questions which determined the
barrier’s legality: (1) whether West Bank barrier construction was
illegal per se; and (2) if building the barrier in the West Bank was not
20
illegal, whether the specific barrier segments challenged were illegal.
The Israeli Court answered the first question with a qualified,
carefully limited approval of West Bank barrier construction. The
court described this as a “complex and multifaceted” issue that “did
not receive full expression in the arguments,” confined its ruling as
“dealing only with the arguments raised by the parties,” and
preserved the question for reconsideration by deciding the issue
21
“without exhausting it.”

14. Israel took this position in both cases. Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 5; HCJ
2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 4, 6, 28-29.
15. Secretary-General Report, supra note 13, ¶ 6.
16. Id. ¶ 8.
17. See Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 3, ¶ 2; Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 122
(July 9).
18. Beit Sourik, [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 9, 60-62, 67, 70-72, 76, 80-86.
19. Id. para. 23.
20. Id. para. 25.
21. Id.
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The approval of West Bank barrier construction was based on an
acceptance of Israel’s position that the barrier was exclusively a
22
The court contrasted this with
temporary security measure.
impermissible reasons for a West Bank route, including the desire “to
‘annex’ territories to the state of Israel,” “to draw a political border”
in order to create permanent, rather than temporary, arrangements,
and other “reasons that are political.”23
The Israeli Court then addressed the second question: the
legality of the challenged barrier sections. The court used a segmentby-segment proportionality analysis with three parts, the third
examining the proportionality of each segment by balancing its
security benefits against the harm done to Palestinians.24 The court
found that most of the segments caused disproportionate injury to
Palestinians, and ordered the government to reroute them.25 The
proportionality analysis included detailed consideration of the
barrier’s humanitarian impact, including damage to livelihood, land
deprivation, road access restrictions, limited barrier passage, property
damage, and isolation through barrier encirclement.26
2. The Advisory Opinion. On July 9, 2004, the ICJ issued the
Advisory Opinion in response to the General Assembly’s request for
27
the ICJ’s direction on the legality of the barrier. After rejecting
Israel’s arguments that the court did not have jurisdiction or,
alternatively, that the court should exercise its discretion not to
render an opinion because the issue was a political matter, the court
proceeded to the merits.28 The ICJ identified four bodies of
22. Id. paras. 28-29, 32.
23. Id. para. 27.
24. Id. paras. 36-85.
25. Id.
26. Id. paras. 59, 63, 68, 71-73, 82, 84.
27. G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec. 12, 2003).
28. Much of the ICJ opinion addressed the jurisdiction and discretion issues, which were
the only issues formally contested by Israel. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 14-15, 2542, 163(1) (jurisdiction) (July 9); id. paras. 44-65, 163(2) (discretion). Those issues are not
addressed in detail in this article, which deals instead with the substantive rulings of the Israeli
Court and the ICJ. However, it should be acknowledged that the jurisdiction and discretion
issues are of great significance and have been the subject of considerable disagreement and
academic commentary. One ICJ judge, Judge Buergenthal, voted against the majority’s ruling
that the ICJ properly exercised its discretion to issue an advisory opinion in the case. Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 1 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal). For examples of differing
academic perspectives on the ICJ rulings on these issues, see Michla Pomerance, The ICJ’s
Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 26 (2005); Richard A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel’s
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international law applicable to the barrier: (1) restrictions on using
force; (2) principles of self-determination; (3) international
29
humanitarian law; and (4) international human rights law.
First, the ICJ considered implications of forcible acquisition of
30
territory and self-determination. On these issues the court held that
Israeli settlements in occupied territory violate international law,31
specifically the right to self-determination, Security Council
Resolution 242 (calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied
territories), and Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention
(prohibiting deportation or transfer of occupant population into
occupied territory).32 The ICJ expressly linked the illegality of the
barrier to the illegality of the settlements, holding that the barrier
route was illegal because it “gives expression in loco to the illegal
measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the
settlements.”33 The ICJ did not directly rule that the barrier’s impact
was permanent or constituted annexation, but noted that these were
possibilities because the barrier and its regime “create a ‘fait
accompli’ on the ground that could well become permanent, in which
34
case . . . it would be tantamount to de facto annexation.”
Next, the ICJ cited a series of humanitarian law provisions,
35
finding violations of four : Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague
Regulations (respectively prohibiting confiscation of private property
and limiting requisitions),36 and Articles 49(6) (see preceding
paragraph) and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (prohibiting
37
While the ICJ stated that it
destruction of private property).
considered the barrier an impediment to various human rights

Security Wall, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 42 (2005); see also Julie Calidinio Schmid, Advisory Opinions
on Human Rights: Moving Beyond A Pyrrhic Victory, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 415 (2006).
29. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 87-113.
30. Id. paras. 115-22.
31. Id. para. 120.
32. Id. paras. 117-18, 120.
33. Id. para. 122.
34. Id. paras. 121-22.
35. Id. paras. 132, 134; id. paras. 24-25 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
36. Convention [IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 46, 52, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
37. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 49(6),
53, Aug.12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
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provisions, it did not definitively find violations of any specific
38
provision.
The ICJ dismissed self-defense as a justification for the barrier,
concluding that the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N.
39
Charter “has no relevance in this case.” There were two bases for
this holding. First, the ICJ held that Article 51 limited self-defense to
a response to state attacks, and claimed Israel did not impute terrorist
attacks to another state.40 Second, the ICJ held that U.N. Security
Council resolutions 1368 and 1373, which recognize a right of self41
defense against terrorism, could not be invoked by Israel because
the terrorist threat emanates from occupied territories controlled by
Israel.42
From this the ICJ moved to consideration of the consequences of
the barrier’s illegality. The ICJ stated that Israel must (1) comply
with self-determination principles, international humanitarian law,
and international human rights law;43 (2) stop West Bank barrier
construction and dismantle completed West Bank barrier sections;44
and (3) return property taken for the barrier or provide
45
compensation.
The ICJ ruling on consequences included responsibilities for
third party states. Here, the ICJ instructed other states not to
recognize, aid, or assist the illegal situation resulting from
46
construction of the barrier. The court added that states must end
the barrier’s impediments to Palestinian self-determination and that
parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention must ensure Israeli
compliance with the Convention.47
The question of Palestinian duties was mentioned once by the
ICJ, when it acknowledged that both Israel and Palestine are obliged
48
“to protect civilian life” and that both took illegal actions. However,
the ICJ did not issue specific findings or rulings in the dispositif on
38. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 133-34.
39. Id. para. 139.
40. Id.
41. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
42. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 139.
43. Id. para. 149.
44. Id. para. 151.
45. Id. paras. 152-53.
46. Id. para. 159.
47. Id.
48. Id. para. 162.
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Palestinian illegalities. Nor did the ICJ instruct third party states as
to any responsibilities regarding support or assistance of illegal
Palestinian conduct.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS’ IMPACT
A. Initial Political and Legal Reaction
The Palestinian Authority criticized the Beit Sourik rerouting as
49
“insufficient” and praised the Advisory Opinion as a victory. The
Israeli government pledged to follow Beit Sourik and claimed it
confirmed the barrier’s general legality, while denouncing the
Advisory Opinion as a political decision which ignored Palestinian
terrorism.50
Despite the Israeli government’s rejection of the Advisory
Opinion, the Israeli legal establishment called for consideration of the
Opinion. In August 2004, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz
warned that the Opinion’s “negative ramifications” would be
“difficult to overstate” and created a “political reality” that could lead
to sanctions.51 President Ehud Barak stated that the Opinion
required consideration and ordered the Israeli government to
respond to it.52
The Palestinian Authority used the Opinion to liken Israeli
occupation to the South African apartheid system that was sanctioned
and boycotted following adverse court decisions.53 Shortly after the
ICJ’s decision, a prominent Israeli-Arab opponent of occupation
stated that there was “no overstating the importance of the ruling”
and that “the language of law” in “an impartial legal decision” can

49. Qurei Plays Down Israeli Decision on the Wall around Jerusalem, INT’L PRESS CTR.
(Palestine), June 30, 2004, available at http://www.ipc.gov.ps/ipc_e/ipc_e-1/e_News/news2004/
2004_06/191.html; Press Release, Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
PNA Hails ICJ’s Ruling over “Apartheid Wall” (July 9, 2004).
50. See Press Release, Prime Minister of Israel, Prime Minister Orders Continued
Construction of the Separation Fence As Directed by the High Court of Justice (July 11, 2004).
51. Yuval Yoaz, Mazuz: Hague Ruling on Fence Could Lead to Sanctions on Israel,
HAARETZ (Isr.), Aug. 20, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?
itemNo=467077.
52. Id.
53. The barrier is often referred to as an “apartheid wall” by Palestinians and others
opposed to it. See, e.g., Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note
49.
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“serve to build an international consensus.”54 The U.N. General
Assembly voted overwhelmingly to demand Israeli compliance with
55
The 115 nation Non-Aligned Movement
the Advisory Opinion.
adopted a resolution for boycotts and sanctions to enforce the
Advisory Opinion, and various religious organizations also
recommended such measures.56
Over sixty petitions have been filed with the Israeli Court
challenging the barrier, some resulting in government agreements to
57
change its route. Israeli intra-governmental tension regarding the
Advisory Opinion’s force continued when Attorney General Mazuz
cited the Opinion as a reason for halting government use of absentee
property laws to confiscate Palestinian property for East Jerusalem
settlements. Mazuz stopped the confiscations in part because of
“grave international ramifications regarding the separation fence”
and “the various aspects for which Israel has been severely criticized
by the International Court.”58 He added, “This is a clear-cut case of
Israel’s interests being to avoid opening new fronts in the
international arena in general and in particular in the arena of
international law.”59
In February 2005, the Israeli government announced a new
barrier route to comply with Beit Sourik and responded to the August
60
The
2004 Israeli Court order to address the Advisory Opinion.
Israeli response stated the new route reduced West Bank territory on
61
the Israeli side of the barrier by more than half.

54. Azmi Bishara, Back to Context, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Cairo), July 19, 2004, available
at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/699/op2.htm.
55. G.A. Res. ES-10/15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/15 (Aug. 2, 2004).
56. Poor Nations Seek Ban on Firms Building Israeli Wall, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Aug.
21, 2004, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm?ObjectID=3585663; see, e.g.,
Chris McGreal, Anglican Group Calls for Israel Sanctions: Campaigners Inspired by Boycott of
Apartheid South Africa, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 24, 2004, at Foreign Pages 18, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1311571,00.html.
57. U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Impact of the
West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities, Update No. 5, at 6, para. 34 (Mar. 2005),
available at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/OCHABarRprt05_Full.pdf.
58. Yuval Yoaz, AG halts East Jerusalem Property Expropriation, HAARETZ (Isr.), Feb. 2,
2005.
59. Id.
60. Press Release, Israel Ministry of Defense, Israel’s Response to the ICJ Advisory
Opinion on the Security Fence (Feb. 28, 2005) (English summary) (available at
http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/news.htm#news27).
61. Id. para. 20.
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The response criticized the ICJ for relying on outdated
information and unbalanced facts, particularly on terrorism and
62
security. The government noted that the Opinion was nonbinding
and contended that its substantive rulings were inappropriate because
63
Israel did not consent to the proceedings. For these reasons the
government maintained that the Advisory Opinion was inapplicable
to Israeli Court barrier cases.64 Palestine criticized the new route,
maintaining that the vast majority of the rerouted barrier remains in
Palestinian territory, and that almost ninety percent of the settlers
and ten percent of the West Bank are on the barrier’s Israeli side.65
The barrier has been and continues to be the subject of further
cases in the Israeli Court. In one case, the Association for Civil
Rights in Israel (ACRI) petitioned the court to enforce the Advisory
Opinion and invalidate the entire West Bank barrier route.66 During
a preliminary hearing in that case, President Barak stated that the
Advisory Opinion is partly positive for Israel and predicted Israel
would ultimately rely on the Opinion.67 In other Israeli Court
proceedings, the Israeli government contradicted its position taken in
both Beit Sourik and the Advisory Opinion that the barrier is
exclusively a temporary security measure. The court has admitted
that parts of the barrier are too difficult to move and conceded that
there are non-security reasons for the barrier route, including political
motivations and retention of occupied territory for industrial
development.68

62. Id. paras. 16, 20.
63. Id. paras. 12, 13.
64. Id. para. 23.
65. Press Release, PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep’t., Barrier to Peace: Assessment of
Israel’s “New” Wall Route (Mar. 2005) (available at http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?
view=facts_wall_f19bp).
66. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), Separation Barrier Route Violates
International Law, http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id=210 (last visited Mar.
22, 2007); ACRI, Route of Barrier Designed to Allow Settlement Expansion,
http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id=212 (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
67. Yuval Yoaz, Justice Barak: Parts of Int’l Fence Ruling are ‘Positive’ for Israel,
HAARETZ (Isr.), May 9, 2005.
68. Yuval Yoaz, State Prosecution Concedes Political Aim for the Jerusalem Fence,
HAARETZ (Isr.), June 21, 2005, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/Print
ArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=590557. Outside court, a government minister stated that the
Jerusalem barrier was built to ensure a Jewish majority and not solely for security. Yuval Yoaz,
EU Solana Slams J’lem Fence: PA: It Makes Pullout Useless, HAARETZ (Isr.), July 11, 2005.
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B. Judicial Developments—The Israeli Court Upholds Beit Sourik
and Distinguishes the Advisory Opinion
On September 15, 2005, the Israeli Court issued its first decision
on the barrier after Beit Sourik and the Advisory Opinion in the case
69
of Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel. The case concerned a
segment of the barrier constructed to protect the Israeli West Bank
70
settlement of Alfei Menashe. On the Israeli side of the barrier were
the settlement, an Israeli access highway (connecting the settlement
71
to Israel), and five Palestinian villages.
The Mara’abe decision included extensive discussion of Beit
72
Sourik and the Advisory Opinion. The Israeli Court stated that it
was appropriate to afford the ICJ Opinion “full appropriate weight to
the norms of international law.”73 However, the Israeli Court
declined to follow the ICJ ruling that all construction of the barrier in
74
The Israeli Court’s rationale for
occupied territory was illegal.
distinguishing the Advisory Opinion was two-fold. First, the court
noted that the ICJ Opinion was not binding res judicata that it was
required to follow.75 Second, the court stated that the Advisory
Opinion was decided on a different factual basis than Beit Sourik and
76
Mara’abe.
The Israeli Court explained that in its view, there were two
primary factual differences between its own consideration of the
barrier and that of the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion. First, the Israeli
Court stated that the ICJ analyzed only Palestinian injury and ignored
the Israeli military-security reasons for building the barrier,
identifying this as “the most important” factual difference between
the two courts’ analyses and describing the ICJ’s failure to consider
77
Israeli security concerns as a “severe oversight.” The second factual

69. HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393, available
at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.pdf.
70. Id. paras. 8-9.
71. Id.
72. Id. paras. 33-74.
73. Id. para. 74.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. paras. 59-72.
77. Id. paras. 62-66. The Israeli Court was diplomatic in its treatment of the Advisory
Opinion, noting that it was not assessing blame for what it clearly viewed to be inadequate
factual consideration of the Israeli position. Id. para. 65. The Court also correctly pointed out
that several ICJ judges criticized the Advisory Opinion as a one-sided analysis that ignored
Israel’s security rationale for the barrier. Id. paras. 46, 52-55, 63-64. The author agrees that the
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difference claimed by the Israeli Court was that its procedures
allowed for a balance of fully aired Palestinian and Israeli positions
through an adversarial legal process; the Israeli Court contrasted this
with ICJ proceedings, which the court maintained were limited to
consideration of the Palestinian position untested by opposing parties
or facts.78
After reaching its conclusion regarding the Advisory Opinion,
the Israeli Court stated it would adopt the Beit Sourik normative
approach—a segment-by-segment proportionality analysis, in which
the court would balance military and security necessity against the
79
injury done to the local population. Application of the Beit Sourik
approach led to a ruling quite similar to Beit Sourik. The Israeli
Court again held that the government had the general authority to
construct the barrier in occupied territory, but nonetheless ordered
the government to reroute the specific segment of the barrier under
consideration because the segment illegally violated Palestinian
rights.80
As it had in Beit Sourik, the Israeli Court accepted without
question the government’s central factual contentions regarding the
barrier’s purpose and duration.
The court agreed with the
government that the motivation for the barrier was security rather
81
than creation of a political border, and that the barrier is “inherently
82
temporary.”
The Israeli Court then proceeded to apply the three part
proportionality analysis it formulated in Beit Sourik.83 Here, the
Mara’abe ruling differed somewhat from Beit Sourik in two ways that
potentially make Mara’abe a more expansive invalidation of Israeli
occupation tactics. First, in Mara’abe, the court held that the Alfei
Menashe barrier segment was invalid because it failed to pass the
second prong of the proportionality test—whether it was the least
injurious means of providing the security protection sought.84 The

ICJ’s failure to consider Israeli security and defense rights is a severe error of law with
significant adverse legal and political consequences. See infra Part III.C-D.
78. Mara’abe, [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 para. 69. The Israeli Court did not address or criticize
the ICJ rulings on jurisdiction and discretion.
79. Id. para. 74.
80. Id. paras. 98-99, 110-16.
81. Id. paras. 98-101.
82. Id. para. 100.
83. Id. paras. 110-16.
84. Id. paras. 112-14.

02__MARTEL.DOC

2007]

10/4/2007 9:51:58 AM

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

317

court suggested that a barrier which encircled the settlement but did
not place the five Palestinian villages on the Israeli side would be an
85
acceptable less injurious means of protecting the settlement. The
Israeli Court’s tacit approval of the alternative of a “ringlet barrier”
in Mara’abe goes farther than Beit Sourik. There, the court bypassed
the issue of suggesting less injurious alternatives, instead invalidating
segments based on the third prong of the test (a balance of interests)
86
and leaving the rerouting up to the government.
The second expansion from Beit Sourik was that, in Mara’abe,
the Israeli Court ordered the government to consider building a new
Israeli settlement access road, and thus its ruling was not limited to
87
the barrier route. The court required the rerouting of the road
because the hardship imposed on Palestinians by the barrier route
was exacerbated by the fact that the route protected the road. The
court’s connection of the barrier to other occupation infrastructure
goes beyond its prior reluctance to view the facets of the occupation
as integrated.88
C. Conclusions Regarding the Decisions’ Impact
Several conclusions as to the decisions’ impact can be drawn.
First, the ICJ Advisory Opinion aids the Palestinian legal/political
strategy of intensifying international pressure on Israel by casting it as
an outlaw state meriting punitive isolation in the mold of apartheid
South Africa. Second, the Opinion, though publicly disregarded by
the Israeli government, nonetheless influences the barrier due to
international pressure, supportive treatment from Israel’s legal
establishment, and ongoing court cases.89
Third, pressure from the ICJ Opinion weighs exclusively on
Israel. All rulings of illegality in the Opinion were against Israel.90
The ICJ’s instructions on the consequences of its finding consisted
exclusively of obligations for Israel and third party states supporting
91
Israel. The ICJ did not make any findings of Palestinian illegality,
nor did it address whether Palestinian violations of law led to the
85. Id. para. 113.
86. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 59-62, 7071, 76, 80, 82-86.
87. Mara’abe, [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 para. 116.
88. See infra Part III.B.
89. See Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 101.
90. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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Israeli decision to construct the barrier. There were no instructions
from the ICJ to third party states not to support Palestinian illegality
related to the barrier. Unsurprisingly, the ICJ Opinion has not led to
legal or political pressure on Palestine (or its allies) to stop the illegal
terrorism against which the barrier defends.
As to the impact of the Israeli Court’s decision, the first and most
obvious result is that the barrier was rerouted in response to Beit
Sourik and other proceedings, but this change was insufficient to end
legal and political controversy because Beit Sourik allows a barrier
92
route that winds through occupied territory. Second, the law is an
ongoing constraint on the government’s construction of the barrier
because Israeli Court involvement continues as demonstrated by
Mara’abe and other post-Beit Sourik petitions.
Third, Israeli Court orders and governmental statements, such as
those of Attorney General Mazuz, have given some official support
93
and vitality to the ICJ Opinion in Israel. Although the Israeli Court
declined to follow the ICJ Opinion, it has not rejected the ICJ’s
94
exercise of jurisdiction. The court further indicated that the ICJ
Opinion carries weight and afforded the Opinion careful
consideration,95 and, in its post-Opinion decision in Mara’abe, edged
to a slightly more critical perspective of the barrier, including
96
consideration of other components of the settlement infrastructure.
The Attorney General expressed concerns with the legal and political
impact of the Opinion and linked those concerns to a substantive

92. See supra notes 21 (Beit Sourik approval of West Bank route), 57, 60 (Israeli
government changes in barrier route in response to Beit Sourik), 49-50, 57, 60 (continuing legal
and political disputes over West Bank barrier route) and accompanying text. The political
contestation of the barrier in Israel and Palestine is reflected in continuing legal petitions to the
Israeli Court. See, e.g., ACRI, Jerusalem Envelope Imprisons Residents of Hirbat and al-Wata,
http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id=264 (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). The fact
that the continued presence of the barrier in the West Bank has international political
consequences for Israel is demonstrated by the so-called “Quartet” that sponsors the “Road
Map” peace plan (the United States, Russia, European Union, and United Nations). See Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace (Sept. 20, 2006)
(available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/72900.htm) (Quartet expressing concern that the
barrier route “appears to prejudge the borders of a Palestinian state”).
93. See supra notes 66 (discussing Israeli Court involvement), 52, 58 (attorney general’s
positions) and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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policy decision on another facet of the occupation—confiscation of
97
Palestinian property.
Fourth, Israeli Court proceedings precipitated concessions by the
government that the motivations for the barrier include several
98
Israeli government
identified as impermissible in Beit Sourik.
admissions that motives include political and industrial
considerations, and that barrier segments will be difficult to remove,
contradict the government’s previous representations that the barrier
is solely a temporary security measure.99
Because the nowcontradicted governmental representations of an exclusive security
rationale were the basis of the Israeli Court’s ruling that barrier
construction in the West Bank is not per se illegal in Beit Sourik, these
developments leave open the possibility of broader Israeli Court
rulings against the barrier. The Mara’abe decision shows that the
court’s course is likely to be a gradual expansion of its authority over
barrier routing through a series of applications of the Beit Sourik
segment-by-segment proportionality analysis, rather than an outright
ban on West Bank barrier construction.100
While the decisions unquestionably have had significant
consequences, they leave much unchanged. Peace talks languish,
Israeli settlements in contested territories persist, and Palestinian
terrorist attacks (while diminished) continue. The judicially rerouted
barrier is still a source of conflict, because a large portion of contested
occupied territory, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and most
Israeli settlers remain on the Israeli side of the barrier.101
It would be naïve to expect judicial resolution of all this. Yet,
even the flawed court rulings had real political results and led to
physical changes in the barrier route. Part III of this Article presents
an agreement-based framework as legally better reasoned and
politically more constructive. Given that the judicial decisions on the

97. See supra notes 51, 58-59 and accompanying text.
98. Compare supra note 68 (government admissions that barrier has non-security
purposes) with supra notes 13-14 (prior government position that the barrier was a temporary
measure intended exclusively for security).
99. Compare supra note 68 with supra notes 13-14.
100. The Israeli Court’s treatment of the barrier includes injunctions, suggestive statements
at hearings, and encouragement of out-of-court settlement, methods previously described by
Professor Kretzmer as part of
the court’s restraining or “shadow” influence on the government. KRETZMER, supra note 11, at
189-90. Perhaps the longest cast of the Israeli Court’s shadow is the possibility that it will follow
the ICJ by ruling more broadly against the barrier in the future.
101. See supra notes 65, 92 and accompanying text.
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barrier have had a tangible impact, a better-reasoned analysis based
on bilateral peace obligations could lead not just to more evenhanded and legally sound decisions, but also to political responses
that could help revive the peace process itself.102
III. ANALYSIS OF THE BARRIER
AND DECISIONS UNDER PEACE PROCESS AGREEMENTS
A. The Peace Agreements and the Barrier
1. The Agreements Generally. There are two sources of IsraeliPalestinian peace process obligations pertinent to the barrier. The
first is the 1993-99 series of agreements popularly referred to as the
“Oslo Accords.”103 The second is “the Roadmap” proposed in 2003
by the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Union
104
and the United Nations, (collectively referred to as “the Quartet”),
105
adopted by the U.N. Security Council. The Roadmap was accepted
106
107
Both the
by Israel (with fourteen reservations) and Palestine.
Oslo agreements and the Roadmap call for an immediate cessation of

102. This Article’s critique of the two decisions does not mean disagreement with them
entirely. To the contrary, there are constructive rulings in both decisions that are consistent
with my proposal that an agreement-based analysis be used. Those rulings include the
humanitarian considerations of the Israeli Court in Beit Sourik as well as the court’s laudable
and detailed concern with the suffering of civilians. This Article also concurs with the ICJ’s
Advisory Opinion rulings on jurisdiction, discretion, legal status of the settlements, and
applicability of humanitarian and human rights law. An agreement-based analysis could be
applied with such rulings.
103. The relevant Oslo agreements are: (1) Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements, Isr.-Palestine, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 Declaration of Principles]; (2) Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, Isr.-Palestine, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 558 (1997) [hereinafter 1995 Interim
Agreement]; (3) Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Note for the Record, Isr.Palestine, Jan. 15, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 665 (1997) [hereinafter Note for the Record]; (4) Wye River
Memorandum, Isr.-Palestine, Oct. 23, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251 (1998) [hereinafter Wye River]; and
(5) Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, Isr.-Palestine, Sept. 4, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1465 (1999)
[hereinafter Sharm el-Sheikh].
104. The Secretary-General, Letter from the Secretary General to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/529 (May 7, 2003) [hereinafter Roadmap].
105. S.C. Res. 1515, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (Nov. 19, 2003).
106. See Press Release, Isr. Gov’t Press Office, Statement from the Prime Minister’s Bureau
(May 25, 2003) (available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/05/mil030525-israel-pm01.htm); Israel’s Roadmap Reservations, HAARETZ (Isr.), available at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=297230 (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
107. See Peres: Abbas is “Best Man Available,” CNN.COM, May 1, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/01/cnna.peres/index.html.
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violence ultimately followed by permanent status negotiations on
108
territorial issues including Jerusalem, borders, and the settlements.
Disposition of the West Bank and Jerusalem is reserved for final
negotiations.109
The agreements impose legal obligations relevant to three issues
that go directly to the barrier’s causes and consequences: (1) Israeli
changes in the status of contested territory; (2) Palestinian
responsibility for terrorism; and (3) Israeli self-defense.110 The
wisdom of using the agreements as an analytical framework for
determining the legality of the barrier is best shown by this—there
would be no barrier if Israel and Palestine complied with the
agreements.
2.

Obligations Relevant to the Barrier

a. Israeli Obligation Not to Change the Status of Occupied
Territory. Peace agreement obligations to preserve the territorial
status quo in the occupied territories are relevant to the legality of the
barrier because much of the barrier is in occupied territories and
protects Israeli settlers who live in the territories as well as Israeli
settlement infrastructure located there. The 1995 Interim Agreement

108. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, pmbl., art. XXXI, § 5; Roadmap, supra note
104, at 2-8. The issue of whether the initiation of permanent status negotiations is conditioned
on an end to violence has been contested and is not entirely clear from the language of the
agreements. The 1995 Interim Agreement called for permanent status negotiations to begin
after preliminary matters were resolved. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XXXI, §
5; see also Note for the Record, supra note 103, at 665-66 (describing duties under agreements,
including “fighting terror and preventing violence,” and continuing interim agreement
negotiations are to be dealt with “immediately and in parallel,” with permanent status
negotiations to resume subsequently to implementation of earlier agreements). Under the later
Wye River and Sharm el-Sheikh agreements, ending violence and participating in permanent
status negotiations were simultaneous and contemporaneous obligations. Wye River, supra
note 103, art. II, §§ A-B (recognizing anti-terror obligations), art. IV (stating that “[t]he two
sides will immediately resume permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis”); Sharm
el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 1 (calling for prompt resumption of permanent status
negotiations within ten days of the Memorandum’s creation). The Roadmap consists of a threephase process, with Phase I including a bilateral end to violence and a freeze on Israeli
settlement expansion, Phase II calling for a transitional Palestinian state, and Phase III
requiring permanent status negotiations. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 2-8. Regardless of what
the agreements say, it is politically impossible for a permanent territorial agreement to be
negotiated and complied with as long as the two sides continue to attack and kill each other’s
citizens.
109. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XXXI, § 5; Roadmap, supra note 104, at
7.
110. See infra Part III.A.2.a-d.
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prohibits changes in the status of the territories until a final
agreement is reached:
The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single
territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved
during the interim period.
. . . .
Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the
status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of
111
permanent status negotiations.

This preservation obligation continued in the Wye River agreement
provision barring “Unilateral Actions”: “Recognizing the necessity
to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side
shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West
Bank . . . in accordance with the Interim Agreement.”112 Sharm el113
The Oslo
Sheikh contains materially identical language.
agreements’ status obligations are preserved in the Roadmap, which
expressly sustains the Oslo territorial requirements by calling for
“implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum
territorial contiguity of the provisional Palestinian state.”114 The
territorial preservation obligations freeze the territorial status quo
115
until permanent negotiations conclude, and thus prevent either
party from unilaterally taking territory that is subject to permanent
status negotiations.
b. Palestinian Obligation to Stop Terrorism. Peace agreement
obligations requiring Palestine to end terrorism are relevant to the
legality of the barrier because the barrier is intended to defend

111. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, arts. XI § 1, XXXI § 7 (continuing a similar
1993 provision). The “interim period” is the time between the 1995 Interim Agreement and the
permanent status negotiations. Id. pmbl.
112. Wye River, supra note 103, art. V.
113. Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 10.
114. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 7. The Israeli reservations to the Roadmap do not
disclaim the obligation to leave the status of occupied territories unchanged or the reservation
of territorial issues for permanent status negotiations. See Israel’s Roadmap Reservations, supra
note 106.
115. The 1995 Interim Agreement prohibited territorial status change not just prior to the
permanent status negotiations, but also through the outcome of the negotiations. 1995 Interim
Agreement, supra note 103, arts. XI, XXXI § 7. Later agreements also recognized that
unilateral pre-negotiation territorial status changes would foil the purpose of permanent status
talks: both the Wye River and Sharm el-Sheikh agreements recognize that because of “the
necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take
any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the
Interim Agreement.” See Wye River, supra note 103; Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103.
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against Palestinian terrorism.116 The agreement of the Palestinian
governmental entity to stop using terrorism has been a condition of
the peace process from its beginning in 1993: “The PLO renounces
the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume
responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure
their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.”117 In
the 1995 Interim Agreement, Palestine moved beyond renunciation
of using terrorism to a commitment to prevent all terrorism
emanating from Palestine: “Both sides shall take all measures
necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, crimes and hostilities directed
against each other, against individuals falling under the other’s
authority . . . and shall take legal measures against offenders.”118
Anti-terror protections are not selective as they extend to all persons
in Israel and the occupied territories. The 1995 Interim Agreement
Annex requires both sides to “protect all residents and other persons
present” in Gaza and the West Bank.119 The italicized language
extends anti-terror protections to settlers, who are “residents” and
“persons present” “under Israel’s authority” in the territories.
The subsequent Oslo agreements increased the specificity of
Palestine’s commitments to stop terrorism. Palestine agreed to more
explicit anti-terrorism obligations in the 1997 Note for the Record,
which listed among the “Palestinian Responsibilities” “fighting terror
and preventing violence,” “combating systematically and effectively
terrorist organizations and infrastructure,” and “[a]pprehension,
120
The 1998 Wye River
prosecution and punishment of terrorists.”
Memorandum established that:
[T]he struggle against terror and violence must be comprehensive
in that it deals with terrorists, the terror support structure, and the
environment conducive to the support of terror. It must be
continuous and constant over a long-term, in that there can be no
121
pauses in the work against terrorists and their structure.

116. See supra notes 13-14, 22. While the placement of the barrier in occupied territories
and Israeli government statements show that some purposes for the barrier are not related to
defense and are legally impermissible, see supra note 68, self-defense against terrorist attacks
would be a legitimate reason for security measures, including a barrier, so long as such measures
meets principles of proportionality. See infra Part III.D.
117. See Exchange of Letters between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin (Sept. 9, 1993),
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/IsraelPLO+Recognition+-+Exchange+of+Letters+betwe.htm.
118. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XV § 1(emphasis added).
119. Id. annex I, art. II § 3(a) (emphasis added).
120. Note for the Record, supra note 103, at 666.
121. Wye River, supra note 103, art. II.
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Wye River included anti-terrorism duties identical to those of the
1995 Interim Agreement as well as the duty to “eliminate terrorist
cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets
terror.”122 Wye River also established specific Palestinian obligations
to prevent incitement and prohibit importation and use of illegal
123
In the 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, Palestine
weapons.
reaffirmed that it would “immediately and effectively respond to the
occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism” and
“take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence.”124
Under the Roadmap, the Palestinian obligation of “Ending
Terror” is part of Phase I, which requires that “Palestinians
immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence” and
that “Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and
terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest,
disrupt and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning
125
violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.” The Roadmap, like the Oslo
agreements, obliges Palestine to take all necessary preventive action
against terrorism and protects settlers as well as residents of Israel
because it covers “Israelis anywhere.”126 The Roadmap, like the Oslo
agreements, prohibits incitement of violence and requires its
prevention127 and calls for third party anti-terrorism steps, requiring a
“cut off [of] public and private funding and all other forms of support
128
for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.” Thus,
the Oslo agreements and the Roadmap establish a comprehensive
Palestinian duty to prevent terrorism and its encouragement as well
as to respond to terrorism immediately and effectively, with thirdparty states also prohibited from supporting terrorism.
c. Israel’s Right to Self-Defense. The peace agreements’
recognition of Israeli self-defense rights is relevant to the legality of
the barrier because the barrier is a defensive measure built in

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 8(a).
125. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 3. The Security Council Resolution adopting the
Roadmap imposed similar duties. S.C. Res. 1515, supra note 105 (demanding “immediate
cessation of violence, including all acts of terrorism”).
126. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 3.
127. Id; S.C. Res. 1515, supra note 105; Wye River, supra note 103, art. II § A(3); Sharm elSheikh, supra note 103, para. 8(a).
128. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 4.
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response to a surge in Palestinian terrorism.129 Israel’s right to defend
against terrorism is expressly preserved in the 1995 Interim
Agreement:
Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against
external threats . . . as well as the responsibility for overall security
of Israelis and Settlements, for the purposes of safeguarding their
internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to
130
take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.

The right of self-defense is further acknowledged in the agreements’
authorizations of all necessary measures for prevention and response
131
to terrorism.
d. The Agreements Create Binding Legal Obligations. The
language in the Oslo agreements and their treatment by Israel and
132
Palestine demonstrate that the agreements are legally binding. The
1995 Interim Agreement identifies “recognizing . . . mutual legitimate
133
and political rights” as one of its purposes. The agreements refer to
“rights,” “obligations,” and “responsibilities.”134 Later agreements
preserve obligations from preceding agreements.135
The Roadmap commitments are also binding. The Roadmap
includes language of obligation and was accepted by Israel and
Palestine.136 It is binding for the additional reason that it was adopted
by the U.N. Security Council to promote peace and security.137
Although the goal of the Oslo agreements was a final peace
agreement by May 1999, the obligations in the accords were not
contingent on reaching a final agreement and the obligations have not

129. See supra notes 13-14, 22 and accompanying text.
130. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XII § 1. The Israeli right to defend
citizens and settlements is in addition to, not limited to, response to external threats. Id.; see
also 1993 Declaration of Principles, supra note 103, annex II (preserving Israeli responsibility
for “external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis”
following military withdrawal from the occupied territories).
131. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XV § 1, annex I, arts. I § 7, II; see also
Wye River, supra note 103, art. II; Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 8(a).
132. See Watson, supra note 7, at 22.
133. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, pmbl.
134. See, e.g., Note for the Record, supra note 103, at 665-66; Wye River, supra note 103,
pmbl.; Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 8.
135. E.g., Wye River, supra note 103, pmbl.; Sharm el-Sheik, supra note 103, pmbl.
136. See Roadmap, supra note 104, at 2 (referring to “obligations” of parties). See also S.C.
Res. 1515, supra note 105 (same in Security Council resolution adopting Roadmap).
137. See S.C. Res. 1515, supra note 105; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, paras. 108-16 (June 21).
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been terminated by Israel or Palestine.138 Indeed, Oslo obligations as
to terrorism and status change have been reaffirmed since May 1999
139
Israel and Palestine
in Sharm el-Sheikh and the Roadmap.
contended in ICJ proceedings that the Oslo agreements and
140
Roadmap were binding, and both have since treated the Oslo
agreements and Roadmap as having ongoing validity.141
e. Judicial Neglect of Peace Process Agreements. One would
think the courts would have carefully reviewed the peace agreements
in determining the legality of the barrier. The peace process
obligations directly address the reasons for the barrier, because the
barrier (1) is a self-defense measure built to defend against terrorist
violence barred by the agreements; and (2) changes the status of
occupied territory, in violation of the agreements, because that is
where much of the barrier is. All of this involves violations of
obligations expressly accepted by Israel and Palestine in the peace
agreements. In fact, the obligations violated by the barrier—those
which require an end to violence and preservation of territory to
allow meaningful permanent status negotiation—are the very purpose
of the peace agreements.

138. See Watson, supra note 7, at 23-24.
139. Id.
140. See Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 20-34; Written Statement submitted by
Palestine, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, 169-71 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/131/1555.pdf [hereinafter Palestinian Statement].
141. On their websites, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Palestinian Authority
have included detailed explanations of the Oslo agreements in discussing their respective
commitments to peace. The Israeli government continues to take the position that the peace
agreements had force.
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Webpage,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). At the time this article was submitted for
publication in October 2006, it was unclear whether the Palestinian Authority continued to
consider the peace agreements binding. Authority President Mahmoud Abbas stated that the
Authority accepted the agreements and intended to comply with them, while Hamas, which
controlled the Authority legislature, had not accepted the agreements. Nidal al-Mughrabi,
Hamas Gives Vision for Governing to Abbas, REUTERS, Mar. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/03/10/hamas_gives_vision_for_gove
rning_to_abbas; see also President Abbas for International Conference on Palestinian-Israeli
Conflict, ARABIC NEWS.COM, Apr. 26, 2006, http://arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/060426/
2006042611.html (Abbas stated that Palestine remains committed to Oslo agreements and
Roadmap and that Hamas election is not an obstacle to negotiation from the agreements). The
Quartet that sponsored the Roadmap called for Hamas to accept the peace agreements. At UN
Meeting, Quartet Hopes New Palestinian Government Leads to Renewed Engagement, U.N.
NEWS CTR., Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19927&Cr=
Middle&Cr1=Quartet.
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Despite this, the two courts scarcely mentioned Oslo and the
Roadmap and completely neglected to apply the agreements’ key
142
substantive obligations to their analyses of the barrier. The Israeli
Court referred to “a political process” that began in 1993 but made no
143
The ICJ vaguely acknowledged that the
further reference to it.
Oslo agreements imposed “various obligations on each party,”
included “various other commitments,” and discussed Oslo mutual
144
recognition provisions, but went no further. The ICJ’s references to
the Roadmap did not address substantive requirements.145 Neither
the Israeli Court in Beit Sourik, nor the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion
examined, or even mentioned, the status preservation, anti-terrorism,
or self-defense provisions in the Oslo agreements and the
Roadmap.146
The ICJ neglect of Oslo and Roadmap obligations is particularly
perplexing for two reasons. First, the agreements were central to ICJ
submissions of the General Assembly, Israel, and Palestine. The
General Assembly request referred to “agreements reached between
the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
in the context of the Middle East peace process.”147 Israel’s written
statement included extensive discussion of Palestinian anti-terrorism
obligations in the Oslo agreements and the Roadmap.148 Palestine
cited Israeli Oslo agreement obligations in arguing the barrier was an
142. Watson, supra note 7, at 22-24.
143. HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 para. 1. It has
been suggested that the Israeli Court’s reluctance to apply Israel’s international agreements to
the barrier is understandable. Watson, supra note 7, at 24. However, the court has considered
such agreements on security matters, relying in part on international treaties to which Israel is a
signatory, in holding that certain state anti-terror interrogation methods are illegal. See, e.g.,
HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817,
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999). Moreover, in Mara’abe, the Israeli Court recognized that at
least one Oslo instrument, the 1995 Interim Agreement, has “legal status” in the occupied
territories. HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 para. 20.
144. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 77, 118 (July 9).
145. Id. paras. 22, 51-53, 162.
146. In Mara’abe, the Israeli Court cited approvingly a single Oslo provision—Article
XII(1) of the 1995 Interim Agreement, which preserved Israel’s right to protect its citizens and
the settlements. Mara’abe [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393, para. 20. However, the Israeli Court entirely
ignored the Oslo Agreements’ repeated prohibitions of status change in the occupied territories
and the obvious implications of the status change prohibitions on the barrier and the larger
settlement program. This highly selective application of Oslo, limited as it is to Israeli rights,
while excluding analysis of provisions recognizing Palestinian rights and Israeli obligations, is
hard to square with the Israeli Court’s criticism of the ICJ for a one-sided review biased toward
the Palestinian position. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
147. G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec. 10, 2003).
148. Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at i-ii, 20-33, 40-54.
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illegal change in status that prejudiced the outcome of peace
149
negotiations. None of this was addressed in the Opinion.
There is a second and more substantive reason that judicial
neglect of Oslo and the Roadmap is a significant failing. As will be
demonstrated in the next section, the three relevant obligations from
the peace agreements—preserving the status of occupied territories,
stopping terrorist violence, and allowing self-defense—conform to
international law principles independent of the agreements. Either
court could have applied the peace agreements and demonstrated
that complying with the agreements, following international law, and
promoting peace all require both parties to do what they promised to
do in the peace agreements, and that had the parties done so, the
barrier would never have been built.
Next, this Article will show how Israel’s obligation not to change
the status of occupied territories under the agreements is substantially
identical to what is required under international law. It will then
describe how the barrier is part of a continuing Israeli violation of
that obligation.
B. Israeli Breach of Status Preservation Obligations
1. Legal Sources of the Obligation. There are two sources for
Israel’s obligation not to change the status of the territories: (1) the
peace process agreements; and (2) the law of belligerent occupation.
a. Prohibition of Status Change under the Agreements. From
the beginning of the Oslo process in 1993, Israel agreed not to change
150
the status of the West Bank. Status preservation provisions prevent
changes prior to the outcome of permanent status negotiations.151 The
1993 Declaration of Principles and 1995 Interim Agreement
confirmed that the West Bank’s integrity and status will be preserved
during the interim period before final negotiations.152 In Wye River
and Sharm el-Sheikh, the parties reaffirmed that “neither side shall
initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank”

149. Palestinian Statement, supra note 140, paras. 143, 151, 154, 156, 376-81.
150. 1993 Declaration of Principles, supra note 103, art. IV; 1995 Interim Agreement, supra
note 103, art. XI § 1; Wye River, supra note 103, art. V; Sharm el-Sheikh, supra note 103, para.
10.
151. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
152. See 1993 Declaration of Principles, supra note 103, art. IV; 1995 Interim Agreement,
supra note 103, art. XI § 1.
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and recognized that this promoted “the need to create a positive
153
environment for the negotiations.” The Roadmap continued Oslo
territorial status obligations, requiring “implementation of prior
agreements, to enhance the maximum territorial contiguity, including
further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a
Palestinian state with provisional borders.”154
b. Status Change under the Law of Belligerent Occupation.
Both the ICJ and the Israeli Court recognized that Israel holds the
155
West Bank in belligerent occupation. One of the principles of the
law of belligerent occupation is that the occupying power must
preserve the status of the occupied territory so as to eventually return
the territory to a legitimate sovereign government.156 The primary
bodies of law governing belligerent occupation are Section III of the
Hague Regulations (Articles 42-56) and the Fourth Geneva
Convention (Article 4, § III, and Articles 47-78). This body of law
imposes restrictions on the authority of an occupying power while
allowing (sometimes requiring) an occupier to benefit the occupied
population and permitting the occupying power to protect the
security of its military.157 The provisions of belligerent occupation law
restrain and prohibit occupying powers from taking a series of specific
acts which would transform territorial and property rights in occupied
territory.158
The central limiting principle underlying the whole of belligerent
159
occupation law is that an occupier’s authority is temporary. Since
belligerent occupation is temporary, the law prevents an occupier
from unilateral measures preempting the disposition of occupied

153. Wye River, supra note 103, art. V; Sharm El-Sheikh, supra note 103, para. 10.
154. Roadmap, supra note 104, at 7.
155. HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 1, 23;
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, paras. 73-78 (July 9).
156. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
157. Hague Regulations, supra note 36, art. 43.
158. Id. art. 46 (confiscation of private property); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37,
art. 47 (annexation, changes in government or institutions which violate Geneva protections),
art. 49(6) (deportation or transfer of civilian population into occupied territory), art. 53
(destruction of property). See also Hague Regulations, supra note 36, art. 55 (requiring
safeguard of certain state property).
159. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN A TIME OF WAR 275 (Jean S. Pictet
ed., 1958) (stating that “the temporary nature of the occupier’s authority is what distinguishes
occupation from annexation”).
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territory when occupation ends.160 Changes in the status of occupied
territory are valid only when agreed to by the legitimate
161
Recent U.N. Security
representative of the occupied population.
Council resolutions acknowledge that occupation authority is
temporary and limited by the ultimate political, economic and
territorial rights of occupied populations.162
The constraints resulting from the transience of occupation
authority and the rights of occupied populations have been
recognized by the Israeli Court. The court observed that an occupier
may not initiate far-reaching and long-term material changes in
163
occupied territory, except for “the welfare of the local population”
164
and that lasting changes cannot be made to serve the occupier. In
Beit Sourik, the court noted that its prior decisions “emphasized time
and time again that the authority of the [occupier] is inherently
temporary, as belligerent occupation is inherently temporary,” adding
that the law of belligerent occupation leaves “no room” for lasting
changes based on “political considerations, the annexation of
territory, or the establishment of permanent borders of the state.”165
Generalized national security interests are insufficient reason for long
166
term changes.
Perhaps the strongest application of these Israeli judicial
restrictions on occupation authority, and one that should prohibit any
significant West Bank barrier incursion came in Dweikat v.
167
Government of Israel (“Elon Moreh”). In Elon Moreh, the Israeli
Court invalidated confiscation of Palestinian private property for a

160. Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory in International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 241,
252 (Emma Playfair ed., 1972).
161. See id. at 244-45.
162. S.C. Res. 1483, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); S.C. Res. 1511, para. 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1546, paras. 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June
8, 2004).
163. HCJ 351/80 Elec. Co. for Jerusalem Dist. v. Minister of Energy and Infrastructure
[1980] IsrSC 35(2) 673, summarized in English in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354, 357; HCJ 393/82
Jam’iyat Ascan v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [1982] IsrSC 37(3) 785, 795, quoted in
HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 para. 27.
164. Beit Sourik [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 para. 27 (quoting Jam’iyat Ascan [1982] IsrSC 37(3)
785, at 795).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. HCJ 390/79 Dweikat v. Gov’t of Israel (Elon Moreh) [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1, reprinted in
19 I.L.M. 148 (1979) (unofficial Israeli Foreign Ministry translation) (subsequent citations to
I.L.M. translation).
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settlement that was permanent and built partly for political and
168
religious motives. The court held that it was impermissible to build
settlements in the territories for political reasons, religious reasons, or
even general security reasons.169
The Israeli Court categorically prohibited the government from
intentionally creating lasting changes in the status of occupied
territories for these reasons as “an insuperable obstacle” to legality
“because the military government cannot create in its area facts for its
military needs which are designed ab initio to exist even after the
termination of military rule in that area, when the fate of the area
after the termination of military rule is still not known.”170 This
language from Elon Moreh must render illegal the creation of an
integrated settlement infrastructure in occupied territory, consisting
as it does of dozens of towns and roads all behind a fortified barrier
that extends deeply into Palestine and runs the length of the territory.
It is hard to imagine how taking years to build an impenetrable 720
kilometer barrier around 300,000 people who consider themselves
“settlers” and live in places called “settlements” is temporary enough
to pass the Elon Moreh test.
2. Israel’s Breach of Territorial Status Preservation Obligations.
The following six points show that the barrier violates status
preservation obligations because it is part of an ongoing
comprehensive settlement program that illegally preserves Israeli
possession of large portions of contested occupied territory. Israel has
accelerated that program since Oslo began.
First, there has been a large increase in Israeli settlers and
settlements in the West Bank since the Oslo agreements took effect in
1993. Since the Oslo process began, the number of Israeli settlers in
171
Israeli West
the occupied territories has grown by forty percent.
Bank housing units increased by over fifty percent since the Oslo
process began.172 The displacement of tens of thousands of civilians
173
and this
into occupied territories violates international law,
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 169, 171, 177.
Id.
Id. at 177; accord Elec. Co. [1980] IsrSC, 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. at 357.
Palestinian Statement, supra note 140, at 54; B’TSELEM, LAND GRAB: ISRAEL’S
SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE WEST BANK 8 (2002), available at http://www.btselem.org/
Download/200205_Land_Grab_Eng.pdf (noting an increase from 247,000 to 375,000 settlers)
[hereinafter B’tselem 2002 Report].
172. B’tselem 2002 Report, supra note 171, at 16-17.
173. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 49(6).
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displacement, along with the significant expansion of the number of
settlements, is a change of status in violation of the peace agreements’
174
obligation to preserve the territorial status in the West Bank.
Second, the government is incentivizing illegal civilian
displacement into settlements by investing in subsidization of
settlements and settlers. Israeli settler incentives include loans,
discounted land, subsidized mortgages, free education, compensation
175
incentives, business grants, and tax reductions. Israeli government
funding of the settlements since 1967 has been estimated at $10
176
billion. The barrier has cost $800 million and is projected to cost
twice that to complete.177 Building the barrier on its West Bank route
instead of the Green Line doubles its cost.178
Third, Israeli law and administrative process sustains the
settlement program. Laws maintained after the Oslo process began
curbing Palestinian development to preserve occupied territory for
Israeli settlements; other laws have been interpreted to permit
confiscation of land for settlements.179 In addition to making and
interpreting laws to promote the settlement program, the Israeli
government has broken its own laws to extend the program,
expanding West Bank presence through illicit support of outposts
180
that violate Israeli law.
Fourth, Israel expanded its West Bank bypass road network
since the Oslo process began in 1993. Because the roads link
settlements to each other and Israel, and are largely inaccessible to
174. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (status preservation obligations in
agreements); 171-72 and accompanying text (expansion of settlements and displacement of
civilians).
175. B’tselem 2002 Report, supra note 171, at 73-84; see also Press Release, Peace Now,
Barak Renews Hi-Priority Status for Settlements (Dec. 30, 2000).
176. SHLOMO SWIRSKI, THE PRICE OF OCCUPATION: THE COST OF THE OCCUPATION TO
ISRAELI SOCIETY, Executive Summary 7-8 (2004), available at http://www.adva.org/User
Files/File/PRICEofOCCUPATION_exe.pdf.
177. Id. at 11; see also Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 3, para. 12.
178. SWIRSKI, supra note 176, at 11.
179. RAJA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO THE INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 83-84 (1997), quoted in Palestinian Statement,
supra note 140, para 155; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human
Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including
Palestine 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/121 (Mar. 16, 2001); B’tselem 2002 Report, supra note 171,
at 59.
180. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized
Outposts,
Mar.
10,
2005,
available
at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Summary+of+Opinion+Concerning+Unauthorized+Outposts+
-+Talya+Sason+Adv.htm.
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Palestinians, they facilitate Israeli transportation while blocking
181
Palestinian movement. Forty percent of the four hundred kilometer
West Bank road network was built after the Oslo process began.182
The road network itself is a change in the status of the territories, and
it assists and sustains the displacement of civilians into occupied
territories in violation of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.
Fifth, the barrier entrenches Israeli possession of East
Jerusalem.183 The barrier, along with practices and laws reserving
property for Israelis while reducing property available for
Palestinians and residency requirements excluding Palestinians, is
squeezing Palestinians out of Jerusalem.184 The barrier impedes
Jerusalemite Palestinians from leaving the city and West Bank
Palestinians from entering. It encircles over 200,000 Palestinians in
East Jerusalem, isolating them from the West Bank and Palestinians
there.185
Sixth, Israeli government statements demonstrate that the
barrier is meant to promote lasting Israeli possession of the settled
territories. Ariel Sharon, the Prime Minister who authorized the
barrier and who was in office when the ICJ and Israeli Court issued
their decisions, stated before the two court decisions that “it is clear
that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part of the State
181. B’tselem, Forbidden Roads—Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank 5-6,
36, Aug. 2004, available at http://www.btselem.org/download/200408_Forbidden_Roads_
Eng.pdf.
182. See Palestinian Statement, supra note 140, para. 151.
183. Israel placed East Jerusalem under Israeli law and considers it part of Israel rather than
occupied territory subject to belligerent occupation law. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of
Israel, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 209 (1980) (Isr.). However, the argument that Jerusalem is not subject
to the law against status change stands on shaky legal ground. The Security Council does not
recognize Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, instead considering it occupied. S.C. Res. 476
(June 30, 1980); S.C. Res. 478 (Aug. 20, 1980). Even if belligerent occupation law is inapplicable,
Jerusalem is reserved for permanent status negotiations under Oslo agreements and the
Roadmap, supra note 104, at 7, and therefore unilateral action by Israel to take portions of
Jerusalem violate a central purpose of the peace agreements, which is to resolve territorial
disputes through negotiation rather than by force. Moreover, the agreements contemplate
Palestinian sovereignty in parts of Jerusalem, calling for Palestinian voting in Jerusalem and
reopening of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art.
II(3); Roadmap, supra note 104, at 4.
184. B’tselem 2002 Report, supra note 171, at 62, 87-88, 102-04.
185. Danny Rubenstein, Battle for the Capital, HAARETZ (Isr.), Mar. 31, 2005; Amira Hess,
Separating J’lem
from the ‘West Bank’, HAARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 26, 2005; The Association for Civil Rights in Israel
(ACRI), Separation Barrier Route Violates International Law, http://www.acri.org.il/englishacri/engine/story.asp?id=210 (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
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of Israel, including major Israeli population centers, cities, towns and
186
villages, security areas and other places of special interest to Israel.”
After the decisions Prime Minister Sharon reaffirmed Israel’s intent
to retain large amounts of settled territory by stating the settlement of
Ariel, deep in the West Bank, “will forever be part of the State of
Israel” and that Ariel and other settlements will remain an
“inseparable part of the State of Israel, technically contiguous with
the State of Israel.”187
Israeli government statements link the barrier to intent to keep
188
The government stated in post-Beit Sourik court
the settlements.
proceedings that the barrier is in the West Bank to protect
settlements and bypass roads,189 conceded that the reasons for the
barrier include non-security related political considerations and the
desire to keep land for Israeli industrial expansion, and maintained
that the barrier is too difficult to move.190 A government minister
acknowledged a demographic motivation, stating that the barrier is
191
intended to insure a Jewish majority in Jerusalem.

186. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the
Disengagement Plan, June 6, 2004, available at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+
Process/Reference+Documents/Revised+Disengagement+Plan+6-June-2004.htm.
187. Aluf Benn, PM: Ariel Will Forever be an Integral Part of Israel, HAARETZ (Isr.), July
22, 2005. Prime Minister Sharon delayed providing requested outlines of settlement boundaries
in order to allow the settlements to expand to the point where they would be difficult to uproot.
He admitted that he delayed “in the hope that by the time the discussion of the settlement blocs
comes . . . these blocs will contain a very large number of settlements and residents.” Shahor
Ilan, Sharon Against the Haters from Tel Aviv, HAARETZ (Isr.), Aug. 25, 2005. The current
Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, stated that if negotiations are unsuccessful or impossible,
Israel will retain settlements in the occupied territories that are part of “major Israeli population
centers” in what he described as “part of the State of Israel as part of a final status agreement.”
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Statement Following Meeting with President Bush, May 24, 2006,
http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/Speechusapress240506.htm.
Regardless of the legality of this position, it does violence to the plain meaning of the word
“agreement.” Taking land is not part of a bilateral agreement if it is done unilaterally because
an agreement cannot be reached.
188. Post-decision statements are pertinent to future cases rather than to critiques of the two
decisions. However, the position of the Israeli government that Israeli possession of large
portions of the settlements is intended to last indefinitely, and that the barrier is intended in
part to preserve Israeli possession of settled territory, invite reconsideration of the decisions to
the extent the decisions were based on Israeli representations, now abandoned, that the barrier
was solely a temporary security measure and not a territorial boundary.
189. See B’TSELEM, BEHIND THE BARRIER: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS A RESULT OF
ISRAEL’S SEPARATION BARRIER 29 (2003), available at http://www.btselem.org/Download/
200304_Behind_The_Barrier_Eng.pdf [hereinafter B’tselem Barrier Report].
190. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
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The Israeli expansion of its settlement program, including its
preservation by the barrier, violates the prohibition of territorial
status change under the peace agreements and international law.
Under the agreements, Israel cannot change the status of the
192
territories so as to prejudge negotiations on their disposition. The
law of belligerent occupation imposes similar restrictions.193 Israeli
Court interpretations of belligerent occupation law prohibit nontemporary measures taken for reasons unrelated to the interests of
Palestinians and disallow lasting changes that benefit Israel.194 These
Israeli precedents prohibit changes for Israeli political, economic, or
195
territorial advantage.
The Israeli West Bank settlement program since 1993 thoroughly
violates these principles. The settlement program and the barrier
preserving it constitute a deliberately comprehensive physical,
institutional, and demographic change in the status of the West Bank
intended to create a political reality too difficult to reverse: lasting
Israeli possession of contested territory—subject by agreement to
negotiation—to the exclusion of Palestinian rights, interests, and
196
Under the peace agreements and the law of belligerent
people.
occupation, this is illegal.
3. Judicial Neglect of Status Preservation Obligations. Neither
court considered the implications of status preservation obligations
under the peace agreements and the law of belligerent occupation. In
fact, both courts entirely ignored what the agreements require.
The Israeli Court referred to belligerent occupation law
restrictions, but did not follow them to their logical conclusion—a
holding that the barrier is impermissible because it is part of an
ongoing lasting change in status that illegally perpetuates Israeli
possession over contested territory. Instead, the court accepted
without meaningful factual examination the government’s
representation that the barrier is a temporary security measure,
rather than a lasting political means to the permanent political end of
197
In so doing, the Israeli Court ignored
controlling territory.

192. See supra Parts III.A.2.a., III.B.1.a.
193. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
194. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 68, 171-91 and accompanying text.
197. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 28-30.
In view of the court’s uncritical acceptance of governmental claims that the barrier is a
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overwhelming factual evidence that the barrier is part of a settlement
198
policy which violates its principles on occupation authority. In this
regard, Beit Sourik continues the Israeli Court’s longstanding failure
to rule on the legality of the Israeli settlement policy, a failure which
rests the court’s settlement rulings on what has been rightly called a
“dubious assumption of legality.”199
The ICJ also neglected to fully consider status preservation
obligations, although it did consider some provisions from the law of
200
belligerent occupation and found violation of several. While this is
preferable to the Israeli Court’s complete failure to consider these
principles, the ICJ analysis is nonetheless legally and factually
incomplete. The precision and reasoning of the Advisory Opinion
would have been significantly sharpened had the court properly

temporary security measure, praise of Beit Sourik as a more intricate and rigorous analysis than
the Advisory Opinion seems undeserved. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 7, at 24-25; Shany, supra
note 8, at 233. The court’s detailed concern with Palestinian suffering is noteworthy. However,
the Israeli Court did not pursue the same sort of careful factual examination of the barrier’s
impact on the status of the territories that should have followed from the court’s stated
restrictions on occupation authority. While perhaps the Israeli Court was more detailed in what
it did analyze, the problem is what it did not analyze. As recognized by a commentator
generally supportive of Beit Sourik as the better reasoned decision, Beit Sourik was not a
“[c]omprehensive legal analysis” because it did not address the illegality of West Bank
settlements and ignored that the barrier route was primarily dictated by the settlements. Shany,
supra note 8, at 233, 243-44. The Israeli Court’s Mara’abe decision replicates the superficiality
of its Beit Sourik treatment of the purpose and duration of the barrier, again accepting without
meaningful analysis the government’s position that the barrier was solely intended for security
and that it was temporary. In fact, at one point the court supported its conclusion that the
barrier was “inherently temporary” by stating that orders to seize land from Palestinians for the
barrier were “limited to a definite period of a few years.” HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime
Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 para. 100. Government confiscation of a person’s land
and property for “a few years” and destruction of homes on such property to build a security
barrier are not “inherently temporary” measures. A few years is a long time, recovering
property taken by the government is difficult, and rebuilding a home on that property—even if
it could be recovered from the Israeli government—is arduous. It would be enormously time
consuming for a Palestinian whose land is confiscated to get the land back and undo the
destruction of his or her home. Further, the Israeli Court’s assumption that confiscation for a “a
few years” is “inherently temporary” is strikingly blithe in view of the fact that the confiscation
is at the hands of the same government which, prior to the confiscation of Palestinian property
individually, has already occupied Palestinian territory generally for almost forty years.
198. It has been noted by at least one experienced observer of the Israeli Court that the
Court has selectively applied occupation law. See KRETZMER, supra note 11, at 99 (observing
that Elon Moreh, which bars creation of facts which effect lasting changes in occupied
territories, has not been more broadly applied to block expropriation of land for settlements or
roads).
199. Id.; see also Shany, supra note 8, at 244.
200. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 115-22, 132, 134; id. paras. 24-25 (separate
opinion of Judge Higgins).
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found that the barrier violates the agreements’ specific prohibitions of
status change in contested territories and connected this to the broad
prohibition of status change that stands at the center of belligerent
occupation law.
To be sure, such an analysis would have led the ICJ to the same
conclusion on the barrier’s illegality. However, an agreement-based
change of status analysis improves the reasoning in several respects,
one being that it avoids the speculation in the ICJ findings. The ICJ
discussion of annexation and self-determination in its treatment of
the barrier’s illegality was based on the possibility that the barrier
might lead to annexation and that this in turn could impede
Palestinian self-determination.201
Annexation requires some
demonstration of formality or permanence; absent such evidence the
ICJ slipped into a speculative discussion of whether the barrier “could
well become permanent, in which case . . . it would be tantamount to
de facto annexation.”202 It is significant that the court ruled that a
barrier intended as a security measure against actual lethal attacks is
illegal because of potential annexation.
The ICJ’s decision that the barrier is illegal because it impedes
Palestinian self-determination is also problematically speculative.
The existence of the right is clear under international law,203 but its
geographic scope as to Palestine is less certain as it is subject to
negotiation under the agreements. Moreover, one of the greatest
obstacles to Palestinian self-determination is Palestinian terrorism.
For those reasons, two ICJ judges were doubtful of a causal nexus
between the barrier and frustration of self-determination.204 These
difficulties of proof, along with limited evidence, led the ICJ to a
murky, unsatisfactorily explained conclusion that the barrier impedes
self-determination based on potential annexation. The weakness of
the ICJ analysis on this and other issues has been cited by both
supporters and critics of the Opinion who have observed that its
credibility is undermined by shallow reasoning.205
201. Id. paras. 121-22.
202. Id.
203. Id. para. 88; U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1.1, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 1.1, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
204. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, paras. 28-31 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id.
paras. 6, 32 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
205. Id. paras. 28-31 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (questioning the court’s selfdetermination analysis). For other criticisms of the court’s reasoning see id. paras. 3-5, 7
(declaration of Judge Buergenthal); Watson, supra note 7, at 25; Iain Scobbie, Words My
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A change-of-status analysis under the agreements and belligerent
occupation law provides greater clarity and more comprehensive
consideration of law and facts. The existence of an Israeli status
preservation obligation is clear from the peace agreements,
international law, and the principles established by the Israeli
Court.206
In the agreements, Israel accepts that the general
prohibition of status change applies specifically to contested West
207
208
Bank territory, and in its decisions, the Israeli Court does as well.
Breach of the status preservation obligation is more easily
proven than annexation or impediment to self-determination.
Proving status change does not require evidence of official formalities
of annexation. Nor is there need for speculation on whether there
might be a status change in the future because there have already
been enormous lasting physical changes in the status of the settled
209
This would be a factual, evidentiary examination, not
territories.
guesswork on the future scope of Palestinian self-determination, the
reasons that right has not been realized, or the possibility of
annexation. To the extent the analysis requires assessment of
whether the changes will last, this again is a matter of fact not
speculation. The changes will be lasting because they have lasted,
and that is because they were intended and designed to be lasting, as
demonstrated by the sheer physical scope of the settlement
infrastructure and government statements regarding its purpose.210 A
holding that the barrier and settlements violate Israeli legal
obligations not to change the status of the territories would be based
on legal commitments that cannot be contested and factual evidence
that cannot be controverted.
This discussion leads to another advantage of an agreementbased change-of-status analysis—it allows (indeed requires) more
comprehensive consideration of facts pertinent to the barrier. The
ICJ, though it considered population transfer and property issues, did
not fully consider the barrier as part of a multifaceted settlement
Mother Never Taught Me: In Defence of the International Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 80 (2005);
Kretzmer, supra note 12, 88-89, 101-02; Ardi Imseis, Critical Reflections on the International
Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ “Wall” Advisory Opinion, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 102, 103-04,
109, 114 (2005); but see Falk, supra note 28, at 42, 49-50 (praising the Opinion’s persuasiveness
and clarity).
206. See supra Part III.B.1.
207. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Part III.B.2.
210. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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policy. The relation of the barrier to bypass roads, to the legal and
administrative framework for the settlements, to possession of
Jerusalem, to financial incentives, and to evidence of government
intention to perpetuate the settlements was largely unexamined.
Also neglected was the question of timing. Specifically, there
was no factual consideration of the fact that, after the Oslo process
began in 1993, Israel expanded and perpetuated of the settlement
program at the same time as it entered agreements that repeatedly
and clearly required exactly the opposite—Israel agreed to leave the
status of the occupied territories unchanged to permit negotiations as
to their ultimate disposition, yet simultaneously made enormous
physical and institutional changes in the territories which effectively
predetermine the outcome of virtually all of the territorial issues
which are reserved for final status talks. The status preservation
provisions in the agreements are an independent source of Israeli
legal obligation. The ICJ, by ignoring them, failed to cite a critical
Israeli violation of law that is directly relevant to the barrier and also
undermines the prospects of peaceful resolution of the entire
Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
Failure to consider the relevant legal principles and engage in a
full factual examination led both courts to give unwarranted credence
to Israeli claims that the barrier is a temporary security measure,
when the facts overwhelmingly demonstrate that it is part of a
politically motivated settlement program that is meant to last. A
proper analysis would have dispensed with the fiction that the
settlements and the barrier are temporary. Such a finding is also a
critical component in properly defining Israel’s right to self-defense,
as will be explained infra in Section D.
C. Palestinian Breach of Anti-Terrorism Obligations
Oslo and the Roadmap do not pave a one-way street to peace.
Full review of the barrier requires examination of Palestinian
noncompliance with anti-terrorism obligations. As was the case with
Israeli territorial status preservation requirements, Palestine has
breached the duty to end terrorism that it accepted in the agreements
and that mirrors well-established international law.
1.

Legal Sources of Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Obligations

a. Anti-Terrorism Obligations in the Agreements. In the Oslo
agreements and the Roadmap, Palestine accepted comprehensive
counterterrorism responsibilities that effectively require it to end all
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terrorism against Israelis emanating from Palestinian sources.211 The
212
Palestinian government agreed not to use terror, to prevent and
respond to terrorism, to eliminate terror cells, and to stop financial
and logistical support of terrorists.213 The Palestinian Authority
committed to law enforcement anti-terrorism measures, including
214
arrest and prosecution of suspects and seizure of illegal weapons.
Palestine recognized that anti-terror protection extended to all Israeli
215
civilians everywhere, including residents of the West Bank.
Palestine’s anti-terror obligations include the prohibition of
incitement to, or encouragement of, terror.216
b. Anti-Terrorism Obligations Under International Law.
Terrorism violates the core principle of international humanitarian
law—protection of civilians against violence. Geneva Convention
Common Article 3 requires humane treatment of civilians and
217
prohibits “violence to life,” murder, and cruel treatment. Common
Article 3 applies to Israeli settlers because it protects civilians “at any
218
time and in any place.”
Article 51(2) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions directly
prohibits attacks and terror against civilians: “The civilian population
as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the subject of
attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
219
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”
The ICJ described protection of civilians as an “intransgressible”
220
rule of customary international law.

211. See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 117 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 118, 120, 125, 128 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 120, 122-24 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 118-19, 125-26 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
217. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3.
218. Id.
219. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Protocol I]; see also id. art. 52(1) (“[C]ivilian objects shall not be the object of attacks or
reprisals.”). Article 48 requires distinction between civilians and combatants. Id. art. 48. The
principles of distinction and protection of civilians in Articles 48, 51, and 52 of Protocol I reflect
customary international law. 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 8, 25 (2005).
220. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 257 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
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These laws apply to Palestine. Common Article 3 applies to nonstate actors and covers the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian
221
Similarly, the protection of civilians
terrorist organizations.
required by Protocol I apply to non-state parties in all armed
conflicts. The provisions protect civilians regardless of the nature or
origins of the conflict or the causes espoused by the parties, and
expressly apply to those fighting against occupation or for self222
determination.
Palestine agreed to adhere to the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols in 1989.223 Palestine reaffirmed this
commitment in agreeing to follow “internationally-accepted norms
and principles of human rights and the rule of law” in the 1995
Interim Agreement.224
Security Council resolutions reinforce Palestine’s anti-terrorism
duties. Resolution 1373 requires anti-terrorism measures similar to
225
Subsequent resolutions confirm that
those in the agreements.
226
resolution 1373 applies to non-state actors and that civilians are
protected regardless of location.227
Resolutions 1456 and 1566 make clear that the duty to prevent
terrorism applies without exception for transnational status or
motivation:
[T]errorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of
the most serious threats to peace and security;
[A]ny acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of
their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and are
to be unequivocally condemned,
. . . .
All states must take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active
228
and passive support to terrorism . . . .

221. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3; Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27) [hereinafter
Nicaragua].
222. Protocol I, supra note 218, art. 1(4).
223. Letter from Permanent Mission of Palestine to U.N. Office (June 21, 1989), quoted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 362 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000).
224. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XIX.
225. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 41, ¶¶ 1-3.
226. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (including non-state actors
among those to whom resolution 1373 applies).
227. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (calling for counterterrorism
cooperation with “states where or against whose citizens terrorist acts are committed”).
228. S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003); S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 227
(restating the first two of the three quoted passages).
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This language rules out argument that terrorism for certain purposes,
or within certain geographic boundaries, escapes legal prohibition.
2. Palestinian Failure to Meet Anti-Terrorism Obligations. Just
as Israel breached its obligation to preserve the status of the occupied
territories, Palestine violated its duty to end terrorism during the
period leading to the building of the barrier. There was a dramatic
increase in Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians from
229
One human rights
September 2000 through April 2002.
organization reported that during this time “armed Palestinian groups
mounted the deadliest series of attacks against Israeli civilians in
decades.”230 From September 2000-2002, more than 415 Israelis were
killed and over two thousand were injured by Palestinian terrorists.231
In March 2002, immediately before Israel approved the barrier, 37
terrorist attacks killed 135 Israeli civilians and injured 721.232 The
intensified campaign of Palestinian terrorism continued through the
courts’ consideration of the barrier’s legality, as terrorists killed over
nine hundred civilians and injured over five thousand from
September 2000 through January 2004.233 Four Palestinian groups—al
Aqsa, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation
234
of Palestine—claimed responsibility for the attacks.
The attacks constitute Palestinian non-compliance with antiterrorism obligations, regardless of Palestinian Authority complicity,
because Palestine was required to prevent terrorist attacks and
235
The frequency
agreed to their immediate and unconditional halt.
and consequences of the attacks demonstrate that the Authority was
unable or unwilling to meet these obligations.236

229. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003, at 459 (2003), available at
http://hrw.org/wr2k3/ [hereinafter HRW WORLD REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2002, at 56 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/
[hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT 2002]; see Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 41.
230. HRW WORLD REPORT, supra note 229, at 465.
231. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ERASED IN A MOMENT: SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACKS
AGAINST
ISRAELI CITIZENS 1 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ [hereinafter
HRW TERRORISM REPORT].
232. Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 45.
233. Id. at i.
234. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra
note 231, at 1-2; HRW WORLD REPORT, supra note 229, at 465.
235. See supra notes 118, 120-21, 124-25 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
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The evidence goes beyond Authority incapacity to prevent
terrorism. The Authority, with approval of its president, paid al-Aqsa
237
This violates
members, including those planning attacks.
Palestinian duties to stop financial and logistical support for terrorist
groups.
Palestinian Authority anti-terrorism efforts were minimal and
ineffective from 2002-2004, the critical period during which Israel
238
Human Rights Watch criticized the
decided to build the barrier.
Authority’s failure to move decisively against terrorism239 and
attributed responsibility for attacks to the Authority because of its
deliberate, politically motivated, lax anti-terror action: “there are
important steps . . . the [Palestinian Authority] could and should have
taken to prevent or deter suicide bombings directed against civilians.
The failure to take those steps implies a high degree of responsibility
for what occurred.”240
Palestine “routinely failed to investigate, arrest, and prosecute”
those involved in terrorism (including Authority personnel) and
released suspects without investigation.241 While it has been observed
that Israeli military action “degraded” Palestinian law enforcement
capabilities,242 Palestine failed to take effective action to prevent
243
Further, the
terrorism when its security capacity was intact.
Authority not only failed to seize illegal weapons that could be used
by terrorists, as it agreed to do, but was actually caught importing
illegal weapons in January 2002.244 The Palestinian Authority also
failed to prevent incitement. Through 2002, Authority and Fatah
officials praised, promoted, and justified attacks, as did Authority-run
media, without effective response.245

237. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra
note 231, at 2-3, 125-26, 132.
238. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF
GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003 62 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
31912.pdf; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 3.
239. HRW WORLD REPORT, supra note 229, at 465-66; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra
note 231, at 2-3.
240. HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 3; see also id. at 109 (political
motivation for Authority inaction).
241. Id. at 3.
242. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56.
243. HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 3 n.239.
244. STATE DEPARTMENT 2002, supra note 229, at 56.
245. Id.
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The Palestinian Authority was cited by an independent human
rights group with treating prevention of terrorism as “negotiable and
246
contingent” rather than “the unconditional obligation that it was.”
Human Rights Watch charged the Authority with creating a “culture
of impunity” and considered the Authority politically responsible for
terrorism.247
Another humanitarian organization described
“[g]rowing Palestinian [l]awlessness” and reported that the Authority
“failed to defend civilians and to stop the violent actions of the
extremist groups.”248 Palestinian failure to stop terrorism is as
deliberate and comprehensive a violation of peace agreements and
international law as the Israeli settlement policy and is obviously and
tragically a cause for the barrier and continued conflict.
3. Judicial Neglect of Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Obligations.
As one experienced Middle East negotiator observed, “in the absence
249
of terror, there would be no need for a security barrier.” However,
neither court analyzed the Palestinian duty to stop terrorism. Instead,
both courts made passing reference to terrorism en route to
dramatically different conclusions on Israeli defense rights.
As to Beit Sourik, this is less troublesome. Had the Israeli Court
reached the result argued for here—that any West Bank barrier route
is illegal—holdings on Palestinian obligation would be necessary for a
legally complete, politically viable decision in which the barrier’s
illegality would be part of a ruling requiring reciprocal compliance
with peace agreements. However, since Beit Sourik authorizes
barrier routes in occupied Palestine, it is probably best that it did not
include a potentially provocative examination of the Authority’s legal
responsibility for Palestinian terrorism. Israeli judicial approval of an
Israeli barrier in the West Bank, coupled with a ruling that
Palestinian terrorism violated peace agreements and international
law, would have made for imbalanced law and volatile politics.
ICJ neglect of Palestinian anti-terrorism obligations is a different
matter. Coupled with the court’s dismissal of Israeli self-defense
rights, this led to a gravely flawed legal analysis with serious political

246. HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 3.
247. HRW WORLD REPORT, supra note 229, at 465.
248. OXFAM INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING PAPER, PROTECTING CIVILIANS: A
CORNERSTONE OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE 2, 6 (May 2004), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/
what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/bp62_prot_civil.htm [hereinafter OXFAM REPORT].
249. See Ruth Wedgewood, The Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the
Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 54 n.13 (2005).
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consequences. The ICJ ignored the fact that terrorism is a cause for
the barrier and ignored the law that terrorism is a breach of
Palestinian legal obligation. As a result, the Advisory Opinion was a
one-sided assessment of Israeli responsibility criticized by one ICJ
250
judge as premised on a “huge imbalance.”
Again, neglect of the issue is perplexing because evidence and
argument on terrorism were presented to the ICJ. Israel urged the
ICJ to look beyond the General Assembly’s request for an opinion,
which made no mention of terrorism, to wider issues relevant to the
barrier and stated it was “inconceivable” to ignore the implications of
251
terrorism. Though it declined to contest the merits, Israel presented
the ICJ with detailed examination of Palestinian anti-terrorism
252
obligations, and their breach.
Moreover, the issue was surely considered in pre-decision
deliberations. Four judges criticized the court’s slight factual
253
examination of terrorism and neglect of its legal implications,
including Judge Higgins, who critiqued the court’s one-sided view of
legal obligation: “[The barrier dispute] cannot be regarded as one in
which one party alone [is] the legal wrongdoer; where it is for it alone
to act to restore a situation of legality; and where from the
perspective of legal obligation there is nothing remaining for the
other “party” to do.”254 She criticized the court for not applying
humanitarian law protecting civilians to Palestine:
[T]he Court should also have taken the opportunity to say, in the
clearest terms, what regrettably today apparently needs constant
reaffirmation even among international lawyers, namely, that the
protection of civilians remains an intransgressible obligation of
humanitarian law, not only for the occupier but equally for those
255
seeking to liberate themselves from occupation.

Commentators have also criticized the Advisory Opinion for an
imbalanced assessment of fact and legal obligation which neglects
256
Palestinian responsibility for terrorism.

250. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 18 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
251. Israeli Statement, supra note 13, at 50.
252. Id. at i-ii, 20-33, 40-54.
253. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 3 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); id. paras.
5, 13 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans); id. paras. 22-23, 25-27, 30-31 (separate opinion of
Judge Owada); id. paras. 3, 15-16, 18, 31 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
254. Id. para. 3 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
255. Id. para. 19 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (emphasis added).
256. See Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 52, 59, 61; Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the
Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 71 (2005).
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On the ICJ, Judges Kooijmans, Owada, and Higgins expressed
concern with the political consequences of the Opinion’s slant and
257
would have preferred a more balanced analysis. Judges Owada and
Higgins called for consideration of peace agreements, with Judge
Owada observing that the “twin principles” of peace—Israeli military
withdrawal from the territories and an end to belligerency—imposed
obligations on both sides.258 Judge Higgins thought that rulings on
bilateral obligations should have been part of the dispositif, to inform
“both parties not only of their substantive obligations under
international law, but also of the procedural obligation to move
259
forward simultaneously.”
The judges’ admonitions were predictive. The imbalanced ICJ
Opinion tipped politics away from enforcement of Palestinian
responsibility. Palestinian and international reaction reflects the
Opinion’s incorrect perspective that the law is on the Palestinian side,
260
Also, as
with resulting political pressure falling only upon Israel.
demonstrated by Israeli government statements and the Mara’abe
decision, ICJ neglect of terrorism and dismissal of Israeli security
gave the Israeli government a rationale for disregarding the Advisory
Opinion.261
The legal and political benefits of considering Palestinian
obligations in the peace agreements mirror those of considering
Israeli obligations. Decisions neglecting Palestinian obligations are
legally and factually incomplete because they ignore that illegal
Palestinian terrorism is a reason for the barrier. An agreement-based
analysis requiring Palestinian compliance with anti-terror duties
would properly lay legal responsibility for the barrier (and for
complying with agreements to end the larger conflict) on both sides of
the barrier.
An agreement-based ruling would also more accurately
recognize and appropriate third-party responsibilities for illegalities
that led to the barrier. The ICJ issued a one-way holding on this
issue, admonishing third-party states not to support or contribute to

257. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 13 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans); id.
paras. 3, 17-19 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. paras. 28, 31 (separate opinion of Judge
Owada).
258. Id. paras. 28, 31 (separate opinion of Judge Owada).
259. Id. para. 18 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
260. See supra notes 49, 53-56 and accompanying text.
261. See Israel Ministry of Defense, supra note 60; HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister
of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 paras. 59-74.
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Israeli construction of the barrier (and by strong implication not to
262
aid the larger settlement project of which the barrier is part). Here
again, the agreements impose more even-handed bilateral restrictions
that are more politically realistic than the ICJ’s, because they extend
third-party responsibility to prohibit support of Palestinian terrorism.
Specifically, the Roadmap demands an end to outside funding and
support of terrorism and reflects similar requirements under existing
international agreements.263 Accordingly, a proper barrier decision
would require that third parties not support Palestinian terrorism
because such terrorism—along with outside support for it⎯is one
cause for the barrier. Prohibiting third party support for the Israeli
barrier and the Palestinian terror that led to it would reach all causes
for the barrier because it would place political pressure from the
decision on Israel, Palestine, and third-party supporters of both to
stop conduct which has perpetuated the conflict, violated the peace
agreements, and resulted in the barrier.
Attention to anti-terror duties would also have the benefit of
confronting Palestine with the political reality that achieving and
maintaining statehood requires ending terrorism. It is unimaginable
that terrorism, and the distinctions relied on by the Authority to
disclaim responsibility for violence, would be tolerated if carried out
by an independent state. In fact, post-independence terrorism would
provide opponents of Palestinian statehood with the strongest
possible argument to curb or end Palestinian independence.264
Finally, appropriate consideration of illegal terrorism as a reason
for the barrier is part of a proper analysis of Israel’s right to selfdefense. The Article will address that issue next.
D. The Israeli Right to Self-Defense
Each court erred on Israeli defense rights: the ICJ in dismissing
them and the Israeli Court in extending them too far. International
law and the agreements point to a more sensible conclusion—
262. See AdvisoryOpinon, 2004 I.C.J. 131 paras. 139, 149, 151-53, 159, 162. The ICJ, in
warning third parties against aiding the “situation” resulting from the barrier suggests a ban on
third-party support of Israeli activities that extends well beyond prohibiting assistance to
construction of the barrier.
263. See Roadmap, supra note 104, at 4; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 41; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.
14 at 114-15 (June 27) (state duty not to support or encourage violations of Common Article 3).
264. The Authority’s self-distancing from responsibility for terrorist groups collides with
reality for another reason. Now that Hamas has won control of the legislature and is part of the
Palestinian Authority government, terrorism participated in, encouraged, or permitted by
Hamas is directly attributable to the Authority.
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recognition of an Israeli self-defense right, properly confined by the
principle of proportionality, that does not perpetuate or exacerbate
the illegal settlement program.
1. Self-Defense in the Decisions. The ICJ dispensed with Israeli
self-defense in six sentences. The court provided two reasons for its
265
holding. First, after quoting Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
266
does not limit the right of self-defense to state attacks, the court
concluded that Article 51 does limit self-defense to state attacks and
wrongly added that “Israel does not claim that the attacks against it
267
are imputable to a foreign State.” Second, the court held that the
Security Council counterterrorism resolutions could not be invoked
by Israel because the attacks come from within occupied territory
under Israeli control.268 This would wrongly disallow Israeli defense
against non-state terrorism and attacks from occupied territory.
While Beit Sourik did not reference self-defense under
international law, the Israeli Court applied self-defense limiting
269
principles in examining whether the barrier was proportional.
However, the court’s failure to consider implications of the illegality
of the settlement program and its truncated segment-by-segment
analysis of the barrier led to a flawed proportionality holding that
wrongly allows a barrier preserving Israeli possession of contested
territory.270

265. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 139.
266. Article 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
The plain language of Article 51 does not limit the right of self-defense to armed attacks by
states. U.N. Charter art. 51.
267. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 139. On the contrary, in its submission to the
ICJ, Israel attributed terrorist complicity to Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. Israeli Statement, supra
note 13, at 44. Non-governmental organizations have reached similar conclusions. HRW
TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 99-100.
268. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 139.
269. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807 paras. 34-85.
270. See infra notes 309-15 and accompanying text.
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A Proper Self-Defense Analysis and the Agreements

a.

Israel’s Right to Self-Defense

349

i. Self-Defense Under International Law. Although the peace
agreements recognize and help define Israel’s right to self-defense, its
source is the inherent right of self-defense recognized in the U.N.
Charter. The text of Article 51 of the Charter does not confine selfdefense to attacks from states, and thus permits response to non-state
271
Further, the inherent right adopted in the Charter
terrorism.
preserves customary international law, which allows self-defense
272
against non-state attacks.
U.N. Security Council resolutions confirm this reading of the law.
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognize the right to self-defense in
273
Resolution 1540 expressly
response to non-state terrorist attacks.
states that “non-state actors” are among “those to whom resolution
274
1373 applies.” The ICJ incorrectly dismissed Israel’s right to defend
against non-state attacks, as Article 51, U.N. Security Council
resolutions, and customary international law all permit self-defense
against armed attack from non-state entities.
The ICJ’s rejection of self-defense against terrorist attacks from
occupied or controlled territories is also contrary to international
275
There is no language in Article 51 or UN Security Council
law.
resolutions establishing this exclusion.
To the contrary, the
resolutions call for comprehensive counterterrorism measures to
“prevent and suppress . . . any acts of terrorism” without exception.276

271. Supra note 266 and accompanying text; Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 33
(separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. para. 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); Murphy,
supra note 256, at 64; Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 58-59.
272. Murphy, supra note 256, at 64-65. A seminal expression of the right of self-defense
came in the 1837 Caroline incident. Caroline concerned use of force in response to attacks from
non-state entities, specifically the United Kingdom’s defense against U.S. nationals who were
supporting a rebellion against the United Kingdom’s government in Canada. While the dispute
concerned the legitimacy of anticipatory defense measures, the right of self-defense in response
to non-state attacks was not contested. Id.; see also Christopher Greenwood, War, Terrorism
and International Law, CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 505, 517 (2003).
273. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
274. S.C. Res. 1540, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
275. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); id. para.
34 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); see also Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 58-59; Murphy,
supra note 256, at 68. The ICJ did not support its conclusion with legal authority or explain why
geopolitical status considerations eliminate the right of self-defense. Watson, supra note 7, at
24; Murphy, supra note 256, at 68.
276. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 41, ¶¶ 1-2; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 41, ¶ 4.
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Subsequent U.N. anti-terror resolutions confirm that there are
no geopolitical status exclusions from the right to defend against
terrorism as the resolutions instead call for prevention of all
terrorism.277 Resolution 1456 states that “any acts of terrorism are
criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, whenever
and by whomsoever committed” and calls for “the maximum extent
possible” of “prevention . . . of acts of terrorism, wherever they
278
Resolution 1566 reaffirms “the imperative to combat
occur.”
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations by all means.”279
Prevention of all terrorism by all means, wherever and whenever it
may occur, by whomever it may be committed, and for whatever
motivation, must include a right to self-defense against terrorism
regardless of the political status or geographic location of its source.
The ICJ was wrong in excluding attacks by non-state actors
emanating from territories under Israel’s control from Israel’s right of
self-defense. By the same rationale, the United States would have
had no right to self-defense to prevent the September 11 attacks
because they were non-state actors striking from territory under U.S.
control. The absurdity of this result demonstrates that the ICJ selfdefense ruling cannot be right.
A more narrowly limited objection to Israeli self-defense against
terrorism is the argument that Israel cannot defend settlers because
the settlements are illegal. This position, while not express in the ICJ
self-defense ruling, conforms to it280 and is accepted by commentators
281
supportive of the ruling. The primary argument made for it is that
Israel should not obtain legal benefits from its own illegal acts.282
There are several fatal flaws in this argument. One is that
violations of law do not necessarily extinguish jus ad bello self277. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 227, pmbl., ¶¶ 1-2; S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 226, pmbl.;
S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 228, pmbl., ¶ 1.
278. S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 228, pmbl.
279. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 227, pmbl. The Security Council’s broad authorization of
anti-terror measures is marked by imprecise draftsmanship. As “means” to combat terrorism
must themselves comply with international law, “all means” to combat terrorism are not
necessarily permissible.
280. Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 93. Ironically, the lone ICJ judge who expressly took the
position that the illegality of the settlements prevents them from being defended was the
dissenting Judge Buergenthal, who voted in Israel’s favor on all substantive issues. Nonetheless
he stated that a barrier protecting settlements was “ipso facto in violation of international
humanitarian law” due to the settlements’ illegality. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 9
(declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
281. Scobbie, supra note 205, at 84; Imseis, supra note 205, at 112.
282. Scobbie, supra note 205, at 84; Imseis, supra note 205, at 112.
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defense rights.283 The right of self-defense exists throughout a conflict
or occupation and is triggered when an armed attack takes place; the
right is contingent on the nature of the attack and not the legal status
of those attacked or the legality of acts precedent to the attack.284 It is
legally incorrect to view self-defense of settlers as a legal benefit
285
created by Israeli illegality. Rather, it is an inherent right triggered
by Palestinian attack. The illegality of the settlements does not
286
uniformly render all defense measures to protect settlers illegal.
A practical problem with the “no defense of settlers” argument is
that it literally leaves civilians defenseless. Denying several hundred
thousand civilian settlers defense against an array of terrorist groups
responsible for hundreds of attacks which have killed and wounded
thousands is utterly irreconcilable with the protection of civilians as a
287
principle of international law. No state will comply with notions of
self-defense that leave large numbers of civilians vulnerable to lethal
288
attack, which is the most compelling reason why the various
rejections of Israeli defense rights are not sustainable. To be sure,
what can be done to defend settlers is qualified by the obligation to
limit the exacerbation of illegality of the settlements. However, this is
not an argument that there is no right to defend settlers, but rather
that there is a limited right. Recognition of Israel’s right to take
carefully tailored proportional protective measures is a sensible
application of self-defense principles.
ii. Self-Defense Under the Agreements. The peace agreements
recognize Israeli self-defense rights. The 1995 Interim Agreement
preserves Israeli responsibility for “overall security of Israelis and
Settlements” and affords Israel “all the powers to take the steps

283. Shany, supra note 8, at 243-44.
284. See Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello,
9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221, 223, 233 (1983). While the legality of precedent acts does not eliminate
the right of self-defense, it is a factor in determining the proportionality of self-defense
measures. See Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94.
285. The opposite is more accurate—denying Israel self-defense rights provides Palestinians
with legal benefit from illegal acts. The Opinion self-defense ruling wrongly protects use of
terrorism as a means of political contestation by preventing defense against it. See Wedgewood,
supra note 249, at 59. Creating a class of Israeli civilians who are defenseless surely promotes
violence to achieve political objectives reserved by legal obligation for negotiation.
286. Kretzmer, supra note 12 at 93 n.41.
287. Id. at 93; HRW TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 231, at 5; OXFAM REPORT, supra note
248, at 7.
288. See Murphy, supra note 256, at 66.
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necessary to meet this responsibility.”289 In the Oslo agreements and
the Roadmap, Israel and Palestine recognized that each was
290
authorized to take all steps to prevent and respond to terrorism.
Like Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and the Security Council antiterror resolutions, the agreements establish a right to defend against
terrorism that does not exclude non-state attacks or attacks from
occupied territory.291 In fact, protection against non-state terrorist
attacks from occupied territory is the exact purpose of Israeli defense
rights and protections in the agreements, because they are intended
to allow Israel to defend itself against attacks from Palestine. The
peace process obligations unmistakably demonstrate IsraeliPalestinian agreement that Israel’s right to self-defense includes
protection against Palestinian terrorist attacks.292
The existence of an Israeli self-defense right is further supported
by the identity between the agreements and U.N. Security Council
anti-terror resolutions. The agreements and resolutions authorize all
means necessary to prevent and respond to all terrorist activity.
There are no exclusions in the agreements or the resolutions for nonstate terrorism or terrorism from occupied territory. Further, the
agreements and the resolutions authorize the same broad range of
counterterrorism measures: prevention, law enforcement, arrest,
prosecution, disruption of financing, and cessation of incitement.293
The agreements also recognize Israel’s right to defend settlers.
The 1995 Interim Agreement expressly preserved Israeli
294
The agreements’
responsibility for security of the settlements.
protection of all Israelis everywhere and all West Bank residents
includes settlers. Moreover, because disposition of settlements is
reserved for final negotiations, Israel should have a right to protect
civilians in the settlements until their status is resolved.295 The
agreements’ protection of settlers supports a humanitarian
interpretation of self-defense that does not leave civilians in occupied
territory vulnerable to attack. The peace accords leave no doubt that

289. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XII(1).
290. See supra Parts III.A.2.b-c.
291. See supra notes 266, 274, 276-79 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Part III.A.2.c.
293. See supra notes 117-28; S.C. Res. 1373; supra note 41, ¶¶ 1-3.
294. 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. XII § 1.
295. See Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 93 n.41; Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 61; Shany,
supra note 8, at 15.
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Israel and Palestine agreed that Israel has the right to defend all
Israelis including settlers.
The agreements also remove an ICJ analytical stumbling block
on self-defense—confusion on the implications of Palestine’s
transitional status. The ICJ was criticized for a double standard,
treating Palestine as a state for participatory privileges but exempting
296
The nascence of Palestinian
it from anti-terrorism obligations.
statehood is relied on to excuse Palestine’s failure to stop terrorist
attacks and to prohibit Israel from stopping them.
The agreements set this confusion aside. They establish that
Palestine is a governmental international actor with independent legal
personality that accepted duties characteristic and constitutive of
statehood, including comprehensive security and law enforcement
obligations to prevent terrorism.297 The Authority’s achievement of
statehood is ultimately conditioned on meeting these
298
responsibilities. Palestine’s status does not relieve it from the antiterror obligations it accepted. Nor does it eliminate Israel’s right to
self-defense, which, if anything, is more acutely and urgently
necessary because of Palestinian non-compliance with anti-terrorism
obligations.299 Under the agreements, Palestine has a legal duty to
prevent terror, and Israel has a legal right to defend against it,
regardless of whether Palestine is a state.
The language of the agreements supports the language of
international law in the U.N. Charter and U.N. Security Council
resolutions. All recognize a right to self-defense that allows Israel to

296. E.g., Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 34 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge
Higgins); Murphy, supra note 256, at 63 n.10. Judge Higgins and an academic supportive of the
ICJ ruling agreed that exempting Palestine from terrorism responsibilities because it is not a
state is poorly reasoned formalism. Scobbie, supra note 205, at 81; Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. 131 para. 34 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
297. See generally the Oslo agreements referenced supra at note 103. In addition to the
specific indices of statehood referred throughout this Article, the agreements, most particularly
the 1993 Declaration of Principles and the 1995 Interim Agreement, contain extensive, detailed
provisions establishing that the Palestinian Authority is empowered to carry out governmental
and administrative functions related to its economy, educational, law enforcement, utilities, and
capacity to negotiate and enter into agreements with Israel.
298. The Roadmap calls for an immediate unconditional cessation of violence and terrorism
in Phase I, with a recognition of a transitional Palestinian state in Phase II and permanent status
negotiations in Phase III conditioned on international conference findings that the requirements
in preceding phases, including an end to terrorism, have been met. Roadmap, supra note 104, at
1, 3-7. Under the Oslo accords, the Palestinian counterterror obligations are immediate and
precede statehood. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
299. Murphy, supra note 256, at 66-67; Wedgewood, supra note 249, at 59.
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protect all civilians from terrorism.300 This right does not exclude
attacks from non-state actors, attacks from occupied territory, or
301
The ICJ holding and academic commentary
attacks on settlers.
dismissing Israeli self-defense rights are based on formalities and
distinctions that do not appear in the Charter, resolutions, or
agreements, and are irreconcilable with international law
unconditionally condemning all terrorism and authorizing broad
means to stop it.
b. Proportionality and The Barrier. Because the right of selfdefense is limited by the principal of proportionality, the barrier is a
302
permissible means of self-defense only if it is proportional.
Proportionality limits self-defense measures to the minimum
303
The proportionality of self-defense
necessary to repulse attack.
measures is assessed by flexible, case-by-case factual examination.304
Considerations include the geographic and temporal scope of the
measures, their selectivity, and the legality of acts leading to selfdefense.305 Proportionality also includes assessment of civilian and
military injury.306
The barrier’s proportionality determines its legality for many
who have concluded that the barrier may be part of an Israeli right to
self-defense. Thus, in Beit Sourik, the Israeli Court’s analysis of
barrier segments was based on proportionality. Commentators
critical of the ICJ self-defense ruling likewise recommend a
proportionality analysis.307
Three ICJ judges who expressed
disagreement with the majority’s self-defense ruling would have
preferred that the Advisory Opinion include a proportionality

300. See supra notes 130-31, 271, 273-74, 276-78 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 130-31, 271, 273-74, 276-78 and accompanying text.
302. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27); Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8).
303. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 317 (7th ed. 1997).
304. Greenwood, supra note 284, at 223.
305. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 168-69 (2d ed.
2004) (discussing selectivity and duration); Murphy, supra note 256, at 75 n.99 (stating that
proportionality requires direction of self-defense measures at “threat and no other objective”);
Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 273, 275, 278 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989)
(discussing geographic and temporal scope); Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94 (discussing legality
of precedent acts).
306. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 262.
307. See Watson, supra note 7, at 24-25; Murphy, supra note 256, at 72-73, 75 n.99;
Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94.
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analysis.308 Many proportionality proponents advocate the Beit Sourik
approach: a segment-by-segment balance of security benefits against
309
humanitarian injury.
However, the assumption that proportionality requires a limited
segment-by-segment analysis is factually and legally wrong. It is
factually wrong because it literally fails to include all the facts and to
judge the barrier for what it really is. The analysis examines the
barrier as if it were a group of physically disconnected barriers, each
with an exclusively localized impact limited strictly to security and
humanitarian consequences in its discreet, isolated location. Of
course the barrier has such impact, but it has additional consequences
because it is not a group of segregated obstacles.
Rather, it is a single, continuous barrier intended not just for
isolated local impact, but to create a continuous zone of
impenetrability that runs the entire length of Israel and Palestine.
The barrier places on its Israeli side a large, contiguous block of
occupied territory subject to permanent status negotiations under
peace agreements, preserves heavily populated Israeli settlements in
that territory, and effectively excludes non-resident Palestinians from
such territory. The factual inquiry required for proportionality
analysis cannot take place under a segment-by-segment approach
because it disregards the factual reality of the barrier’s entirety and
the totality of its impact.
The analysis is legally wrong in part because its crimped,
localized, and segment-based factual examination prevents review of
two legal issues which require consideration of the entire barrier: (1)
the legality of the settlements; and (2) the barrier’s impact as a whole
on the settlements and the legal status of contested territory.310 The
implications of the barrier in relation to illegal precedent acts—
specifically, whether the barrier promotes, perpetuates, or worsens
the illegal settlement program—is a proportionality factor. If the
settlement program is illegal and the barrier will ensure that the
program will continue indefinitely and that its consequences will

308. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 34 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins);
id. para. 3 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans); id. para. 9 (declaration of Judge
Buergenthal).
309. Id. paras. 3, 9 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); Watson, supra note 7, at 25; Murphy,
supra note 256, at 75; Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94.
310. An advocate of segmentized analysis recognized these as legitimate proportionality
factors. Kretzmer, supra note 12, at 94.
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worsen, this must be weighed significantly against the legality of the
barrier under a proportionality analysis.
However, the impact of the barrier in its totality cannot be
properly considered under a segment-by-segment review. A correct
proportionality analysis requires consideration of the barrier and its
impact in full rather than a dissected analysis of isolated segments and
localized impacts. Considering the proportionality of the barrier on a
segment-by-segment basis alone makes as little sense as considering
the impact of a nuclear bomb exclusively on a neighborhood-byneighborhood basis. That is not how a nuclear bomb works. Nor is
the barrier’s impact so narrowly isolated by segment.
The peace agreements are critical to proportionality
consideration because, along with the law of belligerent occupation,
they establish legal obligations that prohibit changes in the status of
the territories. Defense measures that illegally change the status of
the territories—or worsen and solidify ongoing illegal status
changes—are not proportionate. Under a proper proportionality
analysis, the barrier route in the West Bank and Jerusalem is
disproportionate in total (not just in parts) because its route in its
entirety promotes, perpetuates, and is part of a lasting Israeli change
in the status of territories that violates status preservation obligations
under the Oslo agreements, the Roadmap, and the law of belligerent
occupation.
Consideration of the whole barrier demonstrates that it fails to
meet other proportionality considerations. It is not limited in
geographic scope because it is not targeted to terrorist infiltration
sites or Israeli civilian population areas. The barrier is more like a
territorial boundary than a self-defense measure because it extends
continuously along the whole length of Israel and Palestine through
unpopulated territories. Nor is the barrier selectively targeted to
potential attackers. To the contrary it is both over-selective, because
it excludes (or entraps) innocent Palestinians, and under-selective,
because it allows terrorists on the Israeli side of the barrier to stay.
The barrier is not limited in duration. It has taken years to build and
the Israeli government concedes that parts will be difficult to remove.
The barrier cannot be rapidly deployed and promptly withdrawn in
response to changes in the nature of the threat. The barrier is not
linked to the duration of the threat because it will remain for some
time whether there is a threat or not.
In all these respects, the barrier is disproportionate because its
innate lack of distinction extends it beyond the scope necessary (in
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place, persons, or time) to defend against terrorism. What the barrier
does with precision is block off contested territory for Israel, which is
an illegal change of status.
Proportionality should include consideration of alternative
protective measures, which would block terrorists without
impermissibly creating or promoting lasting change in the status of
311
contested territory, and would meet other proportionality criteria.
A barrier along the Green Line is one such measure. If, as the Israeli
government maintains, a barrier is necessary to prevent terrorism and
in fact helps do so, a barrier on the border should suffice.
Strengthening checkpoints is another legal protective measure.312
Increased Israeli military deployment in and around settlements or
areas of suspected terrorist activity, while surely a politically
controversial measure with risks, is another option that would be
temporary, geographically targeted, and would not entail a lasting
territorial change of hands.
A final measure is a series of unconnected ringlet barriers around
313
This is somewhat problematic because it would
settlements.
constitute a physical change in contested territory. Moreover, East
Jerusalem and other settlements adjacent to Israel (or to settlements
connecting with Israel) would almost certainly not be encircled, so
ringlet barriers might not differ much from the present barrier. Still,
a ringlet system would be less of a status change, as it would leave a
smaller contiguous zone of contested territory on the Israeli side of
barriers and allow Palestinian access to more of the territory.
CONCLUSION
Political consequences flow through the legal holes in Beit Sourik
and the Advisory Opinion. Beit Sourik permits a barrier in occupied
territory that aids an illegal change of status in the territory by
preserving Israel’s illegal settlements.314 The Advisory Opinion
ignores Palestinian terrorism and Israeli self-defense, prompting one315
sided pressure on Israel. Moreover, the reasoning and credibility of

311. B’tselem Barrier Report, supra note 189, at 26 (attributing most terrorist infiltrations
into Israel to poor checkpoint scrutiny).
312. Id.
313. The Israeli Court suggested such encirclements would be legal in Mara’abe. HCJ
7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38(2) 393 paras. 113-16; see also
Shany, supra note 8, at 9-10.
314. See supra notes 21-22, 92, 171-91 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 31-36, 54-55, 90, 229-68, 296-99 and accompanying text.
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the Opinion were weakened by neglect of Israel’s status preservation
316
obligations.
An agreement-based analysis corrects these failings.
The
analysis would include rulings that the barrier results from Palestinian
and Israeli non-compliance with reciprocal legal obligations central to
the peace agreements. Palestinian failure to stop terrorism violates
the agreements along with international humanitarian law and forces
Israel to take security measures. Israeli expansion and perpetuation
of the settlements violates the agreements as well as belligerent
occupation law, and leaves Israeli citizens in occupied territories
exposed to violence. A proper ruling would recognize there would be
no need for a barrier if both parties complied with the agreements.
The agreements define an appropriate Israeli self-defense right
because they acknowledge the right while providing a sound legal
basis for its limitation. The continuous barrier in occupied territory
reserved for negotiation is a disproportionate self-defense measure
because it perpetuates Israeli violation of status change prohibitions
in the agreements and under the law of belligerent occupation. Israeli
self-defense measures in occupied territory that do not exacerbate
impermissible status changes (and otherwise comply with legal
restrictions) are legal. Third parties would be barred from supporting
Israeli status changes in the occupied territories (including an illegal
barrier) and Palestinian terrorism.
This analysis is legally correct. It is based on legal obligations
that Israel and Palestine accepted in agreements that conform to
independent obligations under international law.317 It allows Israel to
protect civilians, but prohibits a barrier in occupied territory that
would almost surely serve as a durable physical border.318 It requires
fuller, more even-handed legal and factual consideration that
recognizes that Palestinian as well as Israeli illegalities caused the
barrier. It calls for a fairer international preventive response directed
to both parties and all causes for the barrier.
The agreement-based analysis also makes the law a tool in
puncturing Israeli and Palestinian fictions regarding their obstructions
of the peace process. A holding that the barrier is part of an illegal
status change bursts the Israeli fiction that the settlements and barrier
are reversible measures that do not preempt negotiations on

316. See supra notes 200-10 and accompanying text.
317. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.C.1., III.D.2.
318. See supra Part III.D.

02__MARTEL.DOC

2007]

10/4/2007 9:51:58 AM

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

359

territorial disposition. A holding requiring an end to Palestinian
terrorism ruptures the Palestinian fiction that ineffective
denunciation of a continued, unrestrained terrorist campaign is
sufficient for negotiation and statehood. There is much to be said for
replacing fiction with fact, by ruling that Israel’s barrier-preserved
territorial carve-out and Palestine’s all-but-official terrorism are both
prohibited by agreement and are both illegal obstacles to peace.
The agreements are a constructive framework for legal analysis
for the same reason they are the route to peace. They call for
compliance with a series of interdependent obligations and provide a
legal basis for the comprehensive, simultaneous action necessary for
peace.319 As a result, examination of the barrier through the
framework of obligations in the agreements is more inclusive and
even-handed legally and factually than the fragmented analyses of
Beit Sourik and the Advisory Opinion.
Put simply, if Israel and Palestine did what they agreed to do in
the peace agreements, there would be a Palestinian state instead of
occupation, security instead of terrorism, and peace instead of a
barrier. To close with reference to the judges’ remarks the Article
began with, perhaps if judges “choose to write” to enforce the peace
agreements, the tragic tide of bereavement and pain that washes over
Israel and Palestine would yield at last to the stillness of peace.

319. For a similar perspective without specific reference to or analysis of the agreements,
see Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 para. 18 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins)
(regretting that the ICJ did not remind the parties of their mutual obligations, requirements to
reach agreement and “the procedural obligation to move forward simultaneously”).

